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A  Study  of  the  Realistic  Movement 
in  Contemporary  Philosophy 


by 


Matthew  Thompson  McClure 


Submitted  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  requirements  for  the  Degree  of 

Doctor  of  Philosophy,  in  the  Faculty  of  Philosophy, 

Columbia  University 

1912 


6*), 


A  Study  of  the  Realistic  Movement 
in  Contemporary  Philosophy 


1.  THE  ISSUE  OF  NEW  REALISM. 

The  issue  of  new  realism  may  be  set  forth  by  giving  the  simplest 
possible  description  of  any  situation  in  which  a  human  being  con- 
sciously takes  part.  Anything  purporting  to  be  a  "naive"  description 
is  usually,  on  the  face  of  it,  open  to  suspicion,  so  highly  sophisticated 
do  such  unsuspecting  accounts  often  turn  out  to  be.  A  description 
to  be  naive,  means,  among  other  things,  a  description  which  does  not 
import  into  the  situation  described  any  elements  which  are  not  ele- 
ments of  the  situation;  and  these  elements  must  be  such  that 
any  one  may  identify  them  and  admit  their  presence. 

We  may  take  a  situation  in  which  a  human  being  is  playing  a  part, 
and  for  our  present  purpose  term  that  situation  behavior.  So  far 
as  one's  body  is  an  active  factor  in  a  situation  the  term  behavior  is 
inclusive  of  all  its  actions.  It  includes  internal,  organic  reactions, 
reflex  and  automatic  movements,  and  all  higher  bodily  functions.  My 
body,  moreover,  is  active  within  a  situation  which  extends  beyond 
the  limits  of  my  body.  It  directly  encounters  an  environment  with 
which  it  is  in  continuous  contact  and  with  which  it  is  homogeneous. 
It  receives  stimulations  from  it  and  adjusts  itself  with  appropriate 
reactions.  Now  at  some  point  in  the  genesis  of  behavior  there  enters 
the  element  of  consciousness,  and  at  this  point  a  distinction  is  to  be 
made  between  behavior  and  conscious  behavior.  Just  how  much  the 
term  conscious  behavior  includes  it  is  unnecessary  at  present  to  say. 
Surely  the  environment  does  influence  my  body  and  elicit  responses 
without  any  advent  of  consciousness.  The  savage  gulping  down  his 
food,  may,  like  the  dog  barking  at  the  moon,  be  acting  without  any 
element  of  consciousness  being  present  at  all.  The  environment 
may  be  sensed  with  or  without  the  presence  of  consciousness.  In  the 
former  case  it  is  there;  and  re-acted  to,  often  with  a  high  degree  of( 
direction  and  control;  in  the  latter  case  it  is  not  only  there,  but  is 
known.  The  environment  is,  it  may  be  reacted  to,  and  then  in  ad- 


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dition  it  may  be  known.  When  it  is  known  I  say  that  I  am  aware  of 
it.  Getting  into  appropriate  and  successful  contact  with  the  environ- 
ment may  be  the  significant  thing,  and  the  one  in  the  interest  of  which 
knowledge  has  arisen.  But  then  it  is  knowledge  which  has  arisen, 
and  the  fact  of  conscious  behavior,  however  generated,  invites  analysis. 

We  may  take,  therefore,  any  situation  which,  in  the  loosest  possi- 
ble sense,  may  be  termed  conscious  behavior.  Within  that  situation 
at  least  one  distinction  may  be  made,  the  validity  of  which  every  one, 
whatever  his  philosophical  views  may  be,  would  it  may  be  supposed, 
admit.  There  is  being  conscious  and  there  is  something  of  which 
one  is  conscious.  This  is  at  once  the  simplest  and,  at  the  same  time, 
the  widest  possible  generalization  of  any  situation  into  which  a  human 
being  enters  consciously  as  a  factor.  What  is  going  on  in  such  a 
situation  represents  two  elements.  No  matter  what  "being  conscious" 
is,  how  or  for  what  purpose  it  appears,  some  activity  or  process  termed 
being  conscious  is  present.  And  it  is  equally  plain  that  being  conscious 
is  always  of  something;  something  whether  ideas,  or  thoughts,  or 
images,  or  facts,  or  things,  or  objects,  in  the  interest  of  which  con- 
sciousness is  operating.  The  act  of  being  conscious  is  always  con- 
cerned with  something  other  than  itself.  Being  conscious,  it  is 
plain,  is  never  just  that;  there  is  "content"  of  some  sort,  and  which, 
in  some  sense,  is;  and  which,  it  is  equally  plain,  is,  in  some  sense  dis- 
tinguished from  and  other  than  the  act  of  being  conscious.  Con- 
scious behavior  yields  the  distinction  of  a  "that"  and  a  "what": 
there  is  the  act  or  process  termed  "being  conscious";  and  there  is,  in 
the  broadest  and  loosest  possible  meaning  of  the  word,  the  "content" 
of  which  one  is  conscious.  The  content  element  is  easy  to  identify. 
The  process  element  may  be  more  difficult  to  identify.  It  may  be  so 
exceedingly  "transparent"  that  its  existence  is  never  suspected.  It 
may  be  completely  void  of  any  internal  differentiation.  Yet  upon  re- 
flective analysis,  it  is  always  found  to  be  there.  In  calling  the  act 
of  being  conscious,  or  what  is  the  same  thing,  "awareness,"  an  element 
of  conscious  behavior,  it  is  not  meant  to  suggest  anything  so  definite  as 
a  term.  It  may  turn  out  to  be,  upon  closer  analysis,  either  a  term 
or  a  relation.  At  present  it  is  only  intended  to  point  out  that  a  dis- 
tinction exists,  and  that  the  element  distinguished  may  be  identified; 
but  the  identification  does  not  yield,  prima  facie,  any  metaphysical  in- 
formation about  the  status  or  the  nature  of  the  element  distinguished. 

Awareness  and  content  are  therefore,  the  two  compresent  elements 
in  all  conscious  behavior.  Any  analysis  invariably  yields  such  a 


polarization,  all  so-called  "cognitive"  functions  are  expressed  in 
terms  of  this  distinction.  There  is  knowing  and  something  known; 
believing  and  something  believed;  asserting  and  something  asserted; 
feeling  and  something  felt,  etc.  It  may  be  that  in  feeling  this  duality 
is  at  a  minimum,  that  the  "that"  and  the  "what"  are  less  distinguish- 
able here  than  elsewhere.  The  distinction  is  the  result  of  a  direct 
empirical  analysis  of  the  concrete  situation.  The  two  elements  are 
what  we  find  to  be  there.  So  far  naive  description  may  go  and  no 
further. 

Into  this  simple  description  we  may  introduce  refinements,  and 
then  we  have  a  philosophy.  The  cardinal  problems  of  philosophy  are 
set  in  terms  of  this  simple  and  discoverable  distinction.  They  repre- 
sent attempts  to  mark  off  the  limits  of  the  two  elements;  to  ascertain 
their  respective  natures,  and  to  adjust  the  relations  between  them,  or  at 
least  to  inquire  into  the  possibility  of  there  being  such  relations. 

Some  of  the  essential  problems  may  be  briefly  indicated.  From  con- 
sciousness as  an  activity,  it  is  easy  to  slip  over  to  an  agent  who  acts; 
or,  expressed  in  terms  of  knowledge,  from  knowing  as  a  function  to 
a  "knower"  who  knows.  And  so  we  may  speculate  touching  the 
existence  of  a  self,  or  ego,  or  soul.  Questions  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
process  arise.  It  is  a  purely  psychical  process,  or  is  it  generated  out 
of  material  conditions  and  itself  material?  Does  it  antedate  its 
content  and  thus  come  to  be  regarded  as  possessing  the  greater  sig- 
nificance? Is  it  a  creative  activity  somehow  productive  of  its  content 
which,  consequently,  sustains  to  it  the  relation  of  product?  Is  it  an 
actus  purus,  or  does  it  deposit,  as  it  were,  some  by-product  of  a  nature 
singularly  like  its  own?  Being  conscious  is  variously  designated  as 
perceiving,  judging,  remembering,  feeling,  willing,  etc.  Is  the  act 
the  same  for  all,  or  is  there  some  qualitative  differentiation  between 
an  act  of  remembering  and  an  act  of  willing?  Is  it  possible  to  describe 
the  differences  in  terms  of  content,  thus  leaving  awareness  as  undiffer- 
entiated?  Has  consciousness  any  mechanism  of  its  own?  Philosoph- 
ical speculation  has  been  directed  more,  however,  to  the  content 
element,  using  the  term  "content"  to  stand  for  the  other  element  of 
our  description.  What  is  the  nature  and  status  of  contents?  Does 
the  content  element  occur  in  the  absence  of  the  process  element?  Or 
when  contents  occur  in  the  same  context  with  consciousness,  are  they 
dependent  upon  consciousness  for  their  being?  Do  they  all  possess 
the  same  degree  of  reality,  that  is,  do  all  exist,  or  do  some  merely 
subsist?  Are  all  physical,  or  are  all  psychical?  If  not,  some  may  be 


physical,  and  some  psychical;  and  of  those  which  are  psychical  some 
may  and  some  may  not  be  dependent  upon  the  process  for  their  being. 
The  content  does  not  itself  possess  any  intrinsic  mark  which  gives 
away  its  metaphysical  nature.  It  is  but  does  not  in  addition  proclaim 
itself  to  be  either  physical  or  spiritual.  This  is  a  problem  to  be  deter- 
mined. 

These  various  questions,  seemingly  haphazard,  may  be  grouped 
around  two  considerations.  Some  of  the  questions  have  reference  to 
the  sort  of  reality  which  content  and  process  possess,  namely,  whether 
they  are  physical  or  psychical.  As  such  they  give  rise  to  metaphysical 
or  ontological  problems.  Others  have  reference  to  the  type  of  rela- 
tion obtaining  betwen  process  and  content.  As  such  they  are  properly 
termed  logical  or  epistemological  problems. 

The  new  realism  is  not  interested  in  the  question,  what  is  it  to  be 
a  physical  content?  or  what  is  it  to  be  a  psychical  content?  It  is 
interested  in  determining  whether  contents  are  physical  or  psychical, 
and  if  they  are  distributed  over  the  two  realms,  in  assorting  them  with  ^ 
respect  to  their  proper  place.  But  even  the  question  as  to  the  proper 
realm  to  which  contents  belong  is  a  secondary  one  with  the  new  realist 
and  one  in  regard  to  which  there  are  various  answers.  The  primary 
problem  is,  according  to  realism,  an  epistemological  inquiry. 

Epistemology,  most  simply  put,  is  an  inquiry  into  the  relations  hold- 
ing between  knowing  and  the  something  known.  Does  the  act  of 
knowing  in  any  sense  alter  or  in  any  way  modify  the  content  known  ? 
Is  the  content  of  which  one  is  conscious  determined  by  the  process 
which  is  conscious  of  it  ?  Just  what  is  the  type  of  connection  between 
the  two  elements?  Is  the  connection  so  intimate  that  the  one  cannot 
exist  apart  from  the  other?  Is  there  merely  invariable  association 
or  does  one  element  really  constitute  the  other?  Such  questions  indi- 
cate the  so  called  epistemological  inquiry. 

As  to  the  type  of  connection  mentioned  there  are  two  views.  One 
is  that  the  content  known  cannot  exist  apart  from  the  knowing  of  it. 
The  two  elements  are  inseparable,  and  the  latter  is  constituted  by 
the  former,  has  no  existence  independent  of  it.  Relations  obtaining 
between  them  are  intrinsic,  essential,  internal.  The  opposite  view 
is  that  the  content,  or  some  part  of  it  at  least,  exists  quite  independent 
of  whether  it  is  connected  with  thinking,  or  even  where  it  is  so  con- 
nected, the  connection  is  only  that  of  juxtaposition  or  togetherness 
or  compresence.  The  one  does  not  owe  its  existence  to  the  other. 


Relations  obtaining  between  them  are  external.  Knowing  makes  no  dif- 
ference to  what  is  known. 

Technically  put,  the  issue  of  new  realism  resolves  itself  into  the 
simple  question  of  whether  relations  are  external  or  internal.      New 
realism  maintains  that,  in  so  far  as  knowledge  is  concerned,  relations 
are  external.    The  various  ways  in  which  this  doctrine  is  asserted,  arid" 
the  evidence  supporting  the  assertion,  it  will  be  our  task  to  determine. 

The  above  discussion,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  serves  to  set  forth  the 
issue  with  which  the  neo-realistic  movement  is  chiefly  concerned. 
One  of  its  main  contributions,  as  subsequent  exposition  will  show,  is 
the  attempt,  at  least  on  the  part  of  the  American  realist,  to  say 
something  concrete  about  the  process  element  of  conscious  behavior. 
Traditional  philosophy  has  rested  on  the  assumption  that  the  process 
is  psychical,  something  mental.  It  has  given  little  attention  to  this 
element,  more  than  to  assume  it.  The  emphasis  has  been  placed  on 
the  content  element,  breaking  it  up  into  states  of  consciousness,  or 
sensations,  or  images,  or  things,  or  what  not.  There  are  many 
indications  at  present  of  more  interest  in  the  analysis  of  the  psychical 
act,  resulting  in  the  attempt  to  isolate  and  investigate  it.  There  are 
indications  of  a  general  reaction  to  the  traditional  conception  of  con- 
sciousness with  its  corresponding  doctrine  of  "states"  as  psychical 
existences.  Among  these  tendencies  the  neo-realistic  movement  is  to 
be  reckoned.  It  has  in  common  with  other  tendencies  of  contemporary 
thought  the  general  revolt  against  the  pre-suppositions  and  unbridled 
career  of  idealism.  It  is  one  of  the  many  present  day  movements  all! 
of  which  are  directed  against  the  excessive  extension  of  idealistic 
assumptions,  and  all  of  which  are  alike  in  according  greater  value  to 
naive  and  immediate  experience.  In  addition  to  this  common  tenet,  it 
has  much  peculiarly  characteristic  which  entitles  it  to  a  place  as  a 
distinct  current  in  contemporary  thought. 

II.    HISTORICAL  SURVEY 

The  neo-realistic  movement  has  arisen  largely  in  reaction  to  the 
excesses  of  idealism.  It  not  only  attempts  to  refute  idealism,  but  to 
supercede  it,  to  state  the  fundamental  problems  of  philosophy  in  such 
terms  as  to  render  meaningless  many  of  its  persistent  problems. 

Since  contemporary  realism  is  to  be  viewed  as  a  counter  movement 
to  the  various  forms  of  idealism,  an  exposition  obviously  necessitates 
an  account,  even  if  very  summary,  of  the  trend  of  modern  idealism. 
And  this,  it  may  be  said,  really  means  a  statement  of  the  develop- 


ment  of  modern  philosophy.  Modern  philosophy  when  viewed  in  its 
complete  historical  sweep,  presents  three  essential  features.  In  the 
first  place,  modern  philosophy  has  accorded  greater  significance  to 
the  element  of  consciousness.  Taking  as  its  starting  point  the  world 
of  mental  life,  it  has  assumed  consciousness  as  the  primal  fact.  It  has 
rested  on  the  assumption  that  the  immediate  data  of  knowledge  are 
psychical.  It  has  traveled  from  the  inner  world  to  the  world  out- 
side. That  consciousness  existed,  that  there  was  a  world  of  inner 
mental  existences,  that  ideas,  or  states  of  consciousness,  or  psychical 
entities  of  some  sort  were  the  immediate  objects  of  knowledge  was 
never  questioned.  From  the  world  as  ''idea"  it  has  moved  to  the 
world  as  "fact."  The  immediacy  of  the  psychical  has  been  the  domi- 
nant conception  which  has  reigned  supreme  throughout  the  course  of 
modern  philosophy. 

In  the  second  place,  the  content  element  has  tended  to  be  taken 
over  more  and  more  by  the  process  element,  to  be  absorbed  by  it,  to 
be  integrated  into  some  sort  of  psychical  tissue.  There  has  been  an 
unbroken  progression  in  which  more  and  more  of  the  outside  world 
has  been  relegated  to  the  domain  of  the  inner  life.  Things  as  ex- 
ternal objects  have  receded  step  by  step  and  in  their  withdrawal  have 
given  way  to  mental  existences.  The  universe  of  content,  however, 
has  remained  fairly  constant.  What  the  outer  world  has  lost,  the 
inner  world  has  gained.  The  ego,  from  being  a  substance  supporting 
states  of  consciousness,  has,  by  a  process  of  absorption,  swelled  to  the 
absolute. 

In  the  third  place,  the  problems  of  modern  philosophy  are  secondary 
to  its  controlling  assumption.  What  significance  they  imply  and  what 
meaning  they  possess  is  an  acquired  significance  and  meaning  growr- 
ing  out  of  the  postulate  of  the  immediacy  of  the  psychical.  The 
problems,  therefore,  are  not  direct,  but  derivative,  not  generated 
from  an  empirical  analysis  of  concrete  situations,  but  set  in  the  re- 
flected light  of  an  hypothesis.  So  long  as  this  hypothesis  has  endured, 
problems  have  been  transmitted  from  age  to  age  with  various  refine- 
ments and  accessions,  but  always  under  its  control.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  the  meaning  of  modern  philosophy  is  to  be  read  largely 
in  its  history. 

Each  of  these  three  features  deserves  some  elaboration. 

Modern  philosophy  has  been  largely  idealistic  for  the  reason  that 
it  has  taken  its  start  with  the  mental  and  rested  on  the  common 
postulate  that  the  immediate  objects  of  knowledge  are  psychical.  Such 


a  postulate  is  by  no  means  without  foundation.  We  have  seen  that  the 
simplest  possible  analysis  of  conscious  behavior  portrays  two  fac- 
tors, the  fact  of  being  conscious  or  aware,  and  the  content  of  which  one 
is  conscious.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  this  simple  analysis  affords  a  basis 
for  the  assumption  of  modern  philosophy.  The  presence  of  awareness 
in  all  cognitive  experience  is  an  impressive  fact.  Idealism  points 
out  that  any  experience  whatever  which  may  be  termed  conscious  be- 
havior contains  the  element  of  consciousness.  Any  content  which 
may  be  mentioned  or  pointed  to,  or  in  any  way  identified  is,  by  that 
very  act,  brought  into  relation  with  consciousness.  It  becomes  an 
element  in  a  cognitive  context.  The  ubiquity  of  awareness  in  all 
cognitive  experience  gives  to  the  element  of  awareness  a  peculiar 
significance,  a  significance  readily  lending  itself  to  over-emphasis. 
This  over-emphasis  has  taken  the  form  of  confusing  awareness  with 
its  content  and  the  setting  up  of  certain  contents  as  psychical. 

Furthermore,  conscious  behavior  is  a  term  descriptive  of  a  body  en- 
countering an  environment.  Being  conscious  has  reference  to  some 
centre.  The  contents  cluster  around  it,  arrange  themselves  with  re- 
spect to  it.  Consciousness  and  content  present  the  features  of  a 
centre  and  a  margin,  of  a  focus  and  a  field.  The  process  of  being  con- 
scious is  always  going  on  at  the  focus.  The  contents  represent  a 
gradual  shading  off  and  filling  in  with  respect  to  the  field.  The  ques- 
tion naturally  arises  as  to  the  significance  of  what  appears  at  the 
focus  in  comparison  with  what  lies  beyond  in  the  field.  Shall  the 
focus  or  the  field  receive  the  emphasis? 

Portions  of  the  field,  we  say,  appear  in  the  focus.  The  term  ap- 
pearance has  two  meanings.* 

That  which  appears  is,  on  the  one  hand,  immediate  and 
most  directly  obvious.  On  the  other  hand,  that  which  appears 
is  held  to  be  in  contrast  with  something  more  ultimate  than  itself, 
something  more  real.  Philosophy  is  familiar  with  the  distinction 
between  appearance  and  reality.  Which  of  these  two  meanings  at- 
taches to  the  term  appearance  when  we  speak  of  contents  appearing  in 
the  focus  ?  Is  what  appears  there  more  real  than  what  lies  outside,  or 
is  it  less  real,  only  apparent,  phenomenal? 

Greek  philosophy,  it  may  be  said  in  general,  accorded  more  reality 
to  what  lay  beyond  the  focus.  That  which  appears,  according  to 
Plato  is  fleeting,  changing,  imperfect.  Reality  on  the  other  hand  is 

*For  the  two  meanings  of  appearance  and  their  bearing  upon  the  present 
problem,  I  am  indebted  to  Professor  Dewey. 

7 


permanent,  static,  eternal.  The  Greeks  have  more  respect  for  nature 
than  the  moderns.  Plato's  reality,  so  far  from  being  what  appears  in 
the  focus,  even  transcends  the  field.  Aristotle's  reality,  however, 
is  confined  to  the  limits  of  the  field.  Greek  philosophy,  consequently, 
in  being  more  interested  in  the  field  than  in  the  focus,  is  mainly  real- 
istic and  cosmological.  It  has  little  to  say  about  psychology.  What 
we  have  here  designated  as  the  act  of  being  conscious  was  rarely  ever 
isolated  and  set  out  as  a  definite  object  of  reflection. 

Modern  philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  presents  a  marked  contrast. 
It  tends  to  take  what  immediately  appears  in  the  focus  of  conscious- 
ness as  the  real,  and  that  which  lies  beyond  the  focus  as  the  ap- 
parent, the  inferential  and  more  or  less  hypothetical.  The  focus  is 
the  starting  point,  and  what  is  presented  there,  it  is  assumed  is  psychi- 
cal and  immediate. 

Descartes  is  more  certain  of  the  existence  of  his  own  mind  than 
he  is  of  the  existence  of  his  body.  The  fact  of  self-consciousness  is 
the  one  indubitable  reality.  The  self  is,  above  all,  a  thinking  being, 
and  thought  constitutes  the  essence  of  its  nature.  The  distinction  is 
made  between  thinking  as  an  operation  and  thought  as  content.  The 
traditional  "clearness"  and  "distinctness"  which  for  Descartes  are 
the  tests  for  the  validity  of  knowledge  apply,  not  to  thought  as  con- 
tent, but  to  the  mind's  own  operations.  I  may  think  that  blue  is 
white,  and  thus  on  the  side  of  content  be  in  error,  but  I  can  never 
doubt  that  /  think  that  I  think  blue  is  white.  The  operations 
of  the  mind  as  a  process  of  thinking  is  so  clear  and  distinct  that  it 
transcends  the  possibility  of  doubt.  Modern  philosophy  may  be  said, 
therefore,  to  begin  with  the  clear  and  distinct  knowledge  of  mind  or 
self,  whose  essence  is  to  think,  and  whose  operations  stand  self- 
revealed. 

The  view  of  the  mind  held  by  Locke  and  Berkeley  is  essentially 
the  same  as  that  of  Descartes.  "Since  the  mind,  in  all  its  thoughts 
and  reasonings,  hath  no  other  immediate  object,  but  its  own  ideas, 
which  it  alone  does  or  can  contemplate,  it  is  evident  that  our  knowl- 
edge is  only  conversant  about  them." 

I 

A  somewhat  similar  passage  may  be  cited  from  Berk- 
eley's Principles  of  Human  Knowledge.  "It  is  evident  to  any 
one  who  takes  a  survey  of  the  objects  of  human  knowledge, 
that  they  are  ideas  actually  imprinted  on  the  senses,  or  else  such 


^Locke:     Essay  C.  Human  Understanding,  IV,  I.  I. 

8 


as  are  perceived  by  attending  to  the  passions  and  operations  of  the 
mind ;  or,  lastly,  ideas  formed  by  help  of  the  memory  and  imagina- 
tion. *  *  *  *  But  besides  all  that  endless  variety  of  ideas  or  objects 
of  knowledge,  there  is  likewise  something  which  knows  or  pictures 
them.  *  *  *  *  This  perceiving,  active  being  is  what  is  called  Miflc^ 
Spirit,  Soul,  or  Myself."  With  Hume  ideas  are  distinguished  into 
impressions  and  ideas.  Kant  uses  the  term  "representation,"  Mill, 
"sensation."  Later  "states  of  consciousness"  was  the  term.  But 
under  whatever  name,  the  Immediacy  of  the  Psychical  is  the  funda- 
mental postulate  of  modern  idealism.  In  a  more  recent  form,  we  may 
quote  Bradley.  "Sentient  experience,  in  short,  is  reality,  and  what 
is  not  this  is  not  real.  We  may  say,  in  other  words,  that  there  is  no 
being  or  fact  outside  of  that  which  is  commonly  called  psychical 
existence,  feeling,  thought,  and  volition  (any  group  under  which 
we  class  psychical  phenomena)  are  all  the  material  of  existence,  and 
there  is  no  other  material,  actual  or  even  possible."*  In  further  sup- 
port of  this  view  one  has  only  to  turn  to  the  ordinary  text-book  in 
psychology  to  find  psychology  defined  as  the  science  of  consciousness. 
In  illustration  of  the  second  essential  characteristic  of  modern  phi- 
losophy, we  may  begin  with  the  dualism  of  Descartes.  Set 
over  against  the  realm  of  mind,  wholly  discontinuous  with  and 
qualitatively  different  from  it,  is  the  realm  of  body.  These  two 
spheres  of  existence  are  mutually  exclusive.  The  one  is  thinking, 
active,  inextended ;  the  other,  non-thinking,  passive,  extended.  The 
thinking  mind  is  without  content,  the  extended  body  without  quality. 
But  there  arises,  as  a  result  of  the  connection  between  these  juxta- 
posed realms,  a  host  of  contents  of  a  peculiar  nature,  namely,  sensa- 
tions, memories,  imaginations,  volitions.  The  definite  position  of 
this  peculiar  realm  of  contents,  the  future  states  of  consciousness,  is 
somewhat  unclear.  Viewed  in  connecton  with  Descartes'  treatment 
of  animal  automatism,  there  is  ground  for  supposing  them  non-psychi- 
cal. At  any  rate,  modern  philosophy  begins  with  two  worlds,  the 
one  mental;  the  other  extra-mental,  an  external  world  of  physical 
reality  the  existence  of  which  is  totally  independent  of  mind.  Further- 
more, due  to  connections  between  them,  there  is  an  order  of  existences 
whose  status  is  somewhat  uncertain,  an  order  of  contents  whose  meta- 
physical nature  and  relations  to  the  act  of  being  conscious  is  but  vague- 
ly determined. 


^Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  144. 


If  Descartes  is  somewhat  indefinite  in  the  fixation  of  this  third 
realm,  we  find  an  explicit  localization  of  it  by  Locke.  Locke's  prob- 
lem is  set  in  terms  of  the  mind-object  relation.  The  connection  be- 
tween the  related  terms  are  "ideas."  A  "representative"  theory  of 
knowledge  is  specifically  formulated.  We  have  the  self  and  its  ideas, 
or  states  of  consciousness,  purely  psychical  existences,  which  are  the 
immediate  objects  of  knowledge  and  beyond  which  the  self  can  never 
directly  pass.  But  in  addition,  there  is  the  whole  outside  world, 
the  real  existence  of  which  Locke  never  questions,  and  somehow  he 
feels  that  an  adequate  doctrine  of  knowledge  must  include  some  re- 
lationship between  ideas  and  things.  In  consequence  ideas  are  re- 
garded as  "representative"  of  things.  We  know  things  only  through 
the  "intervention"  of  the  ideas  we  have  of  them.  Matter  is  divided  into 
primary  and  secondary  qualities.  In  the  case  of  the  former  the  idea 
is  a  copy  of  the  quality,  a  photographic  reproduction,  a  faithful  rep- 
resentative of  it  just  as  it  exists  in  rerum  natura;  in  the  case  of  the 
latter,  we  are  at  a  loss  to  formulate  any  correspondence.  Secondary 
qualities  of  matter  have  no  known  existence  apart  from  the  mind 
which  perceives  them.  The  subjectivity  of  the  secondary  qualities 
is  the  first  step  in  the  concession  of  matter  to  mind.  The  primary 
qualities,  however,  are  real  existences  within  the  physical  world,  ade- 
quately though  indirectly  known  through  the  vicarious  function  of 
ideas.  Locke's  view  may  be  termed  hypothetical  or  representative 
realism. 

With  Locke,  therefore,  content  breaks  up  into  the  psychical  and 
physical,  into  intra-mental  and  extra-mental.  Only  intra- 
mental  content  can  be  an  immediate  object  of  knowledge.  Locke 
distinguishes  the  internal  operations  of  the  mind  from  the  data  upon 
which  it  operates.  The  mind  is  endowed  with  an  elaborate  mechan- 
ism, but  the  psychical  data,  simple  ideas,  or  the  combination  of  these 
by  the  active  operations  of  the  mind,  have  no  existence  apart  from 
the  mind  which  creates  them.  Psychical  contents  not  only  are,  but  in 
addition  are  dependent  on  the  psychical  act  for  their  being. 

A  second  step  in  the  direction  of  complete  subjectivity  is  taken 
when  Berkeley  points  out  that  the  same  arguments  which  go  to  show 
the  subjectivity  of  secondary  qualities,  will,  when  logically  carried 
out,  lead  to  the  subjectivity  of  the  primary.  The  transition  from 
an  idea  to  a  thing  is  impossible  and  absurd.  On  the  assumption 
that  the  psychical  data  are  the  only  immediate  objects  of  knowledge, 
there  is  no  place  for  material  reality  beyond  the  mental.  As  to  the 

10 


supposed  correspondence  between  idea  and  thing,  Berkeley  asks,  How 
can  an  inextended  idea  be  a  copy  of  an  extended  thing?  An  idea 
can  only  be  like  another  idea.  The  concession  of  matter  to  mind  is 
now  complete. 

A  further  point  is  to  be  noted.  The  "esse  est  percipi"  of  Berkeley^ 
whatever  be  its  logical  implications,  is  not  intended  to  lead  to  solip- 
sism. The  real  existence  of  other  minds,  of  relations,  and  of  God 
Berkeley  has  no  intention  of  reducing  to  the  psychical  content  of 
a  perceiving  mind.  Their  existence  is  independent  of  their  being 
apprehended.  The  components  of  Berkeley's  world  are  the  self  and 
its  states  or  ideas,  other  selves  and  their  ideas,  God  and  his  thoughts. 
So  far  as  the  existence  of  other  minds  and  of  God  are  concerned, 
though  spiritual  in  their  nature,  they  are  in  no  sense  conditioned 
or  in  any  way  dependent  on  their  being  known.  Though  immaterial, 
they  are  real  beyond  any  individual,  human  or  divine,  perception  of 
them.  All  content  for  Berkeley  is  psychical,  some  of  which  owes  its 
existence  to  its  being  perceived,  and  some  which  does  not,  namely, 
other  minds,  relations,  and  God. 

Subjectivity  reaches  its  limit  in  Hume.  The  self  of  Descartes, 
Locke,  and  Berkeley  disappears  as  an  entity.  It  is  lost  in  the  flow 
of  conscious  states  and  an  empirical  search  fails  to  find  anything 
over  and  above  an  aggregate  of  states  of  consciousness.  Locke's 
ideas  are  now  differentiated  into  impressions  and  ideas,  the  former 
preceding  and  giving  rise  to  the  latter.  Relations  and  connections 
between  psychical  contents  are  reduced  to  ps}'chological  laws  of  asso- 
ciation grounded  in  the  constitution  of  human  nature.  Locke's  pri- 
mary qualities  are  reduced  to  impressions  of  unknown  origin,  and  the 
self  to  a  bundle  of  perceptions. 

Such  was  the  course  from  external  reality  to  subjectivity,  from 
physical  content  to  psychical  content  as  it  progressed  in  British  phi- 
losophy. It  is  a  passage  from  nature  to  a  logically  implied  solipsism. 
Different  is  its  course  in  continental  philosophy,  and  different  its 
conclusion.  Here  it  is  passage  from  external  reality  to  absolutism. 

Pre-Kantian  rationalism  was  the  attempt  to  deduce,  from  the  ac- 
tivity of  the  knowing  process,  all  the  contents  of  knowledge.  The 
origin  of  knowledge  was  to  be  sought  in  the  productive  power  of 
psychical  operations,  which,  it  was  concluded,  were  capable  from  their 
own  exercise  of  an  out-put  of  cognizable  content.  Kant  was  influ- 
enced both  by  Hume  and  by  Leibniz.  Hume's  conclusions  were  dis- 
quieting, but  on  the  empirical  assumption,  incapable  of  refutation. 

11 


Kant  returns  to  the  original  point  of  view  of  Locke,  his  problem 
is  set  in  terms  of  the  mind-object  relation.  The  solution  is  also  one 
in  which,  in  post-Kantian  philosophy,  the  object  tends  more  and 
more  to  disappear.  But  it  is  a  compensatory  progression;  what  the 
object  loses,  the  mind  absorbs.  The  mind  term  of  the  relation  does 
not  embrace  the  object  and  then  dwindle,  it  embraces  the  object  term 
and  swells  to  the  absolute. 

The  mechanism  of  Locke's  doctrine  comprises  primary  qualities  of 
matter  (the  object),  the  self  (the  subject),  and  intervening  ideas, 
the  materials  of  knowledge;  and  knowledge  represents  a  synthesis 
of  these  ideas.  The  machinery  of  Kant's  doctrine  comprises  the  thing- 
in-itself  (the  object),  the  transcendental  ego  (the  subject),  and  the 
world  of  phenomena,  or  experience,  the  result  of  the  inter-connec- 
tions of  the  two  terms.  For  Locke  the  mind,  in  its  reception  of  simple 
ideas,  was  passive,  consequently  viewed  as  passive  throughout  the 
course  of  British  empiricism,  the  psychical  dwindles.  For  Kant  the 
ego  is  creative  in  its  initial  activity  consequently  the  psychical  en- 
larges. Nature  for  Kant  is  a  construct,  and  the  understanding  pre- 
scribes its  laws.  The  universe  of  content  is  phenomenal  with  an  out- 
standing thing-in-itself. 

What  Berkeley  did  for  Locke's  concept  of  matter,  Fichte  does  for 
Kant's  thing-in-itself.  It  is  throughout  the  course  of  subsequent  phi- 
losophy dropped  out.  But  the  transcendental  ego  undergoes  a  vastly 
different  history  from  the  destruction  of  Locke's  and  Berkeley's  ego 
at  the  hands  of  Hume.  The  various  transcendental  ego's  of  Kant 
are  gathered  together  and  merged  into  the  absolute.  The  absolute  is 
developed  in  the  direction  of  intellectualism  by  Hegel,  and  in  the 
direction  of  voluntarism  by  Schopenhauer. 

The  third  feature  of  modern  philosophy  pertains  to  the  source, 
pertinency  and  directness  of  its  problems.  Its  issues  are  chiefly 
logical  or  epistemological,  dealing  with  the  origin,  extent,  and  validity 
of  knowledge.  Such  problems  are  secondary  to  the  underlying  as- 
sumption of  all  idealism,  the  immediacy  of  the  psychical;  their  value 
is  derivative,  is  acquired  in  virtue  of  this  one  controlling  assumption. 
If  the  immediate  data  of  knowledge  are  states  of  consciousness,  then 
the  problems  touching  the  validity  of  knowlerge,  correspondence  and 
coherence  theories  of  truth,  analogical  and  ejective  inferences  are 
genuine  problems.  On  such  an  assumption,  physical  reality  beyond 
the  domain  of  consciousness  is  at  most  hypothetical,  can  never  be 
brought  within  the  circle,  is  impossible  of  identification.  No  wonder 

12 


it  should  have  dropped  out !  Epfstemological  dualism  could  obviously 
not  maintain  itself.  Some  form  of  pure  idealism  is  the  only  satisfying 
conclusion  to  be  reached  on  the  given  assumption.  If  the  immediate 
is  psychical,  and  the  psychical  can  only  know  the  psychical,  then  every- 
thing is  psychical.  Modern  philosophy  may  be  said  to  be  a  series  of 
descriptions  each  given  in  such  a  manner  that  no  violence  is  done 
to  its  underlying  postulate.  The  postulate  has  been  maintained,  even 
at  the  price  of  dialectic. 

Let  us  suppose  that  the  immediate  objects  of  knowledge  are  "ideas," 
then  what  follows?  It  follows  that  if  there  be  any  physical  reality, 
it  can  be  known  only  in  terms  of  ideas.  Consequently  a  representative 
theory  of  perception  follows.  If  the  psychical  and  physical  are  two 
orders  of  existence  then  theories  touching  their  interaction  are  of 
genuine  interest.  Furthermore  the  doctrine  of  ideas  gives  rise  to 
an  atomistic  psychology.  And  since  knowledge  is  a  synthesis  of 
ideas,  the  synthetizing  material  is  naturally  first  sought  among  the 
ideas.  So  long,  therefore,  as  Hume  failed  to  find  relations  and  con- 
nections among  the  contents  of  experience,  it  is  natural  that  T.  H. 
Green  should  have  gone  outside  of  experience  in  search  of  relating  ma- 
terial. It  is  natural  also  that  Professor  James,  sticking  to  the  stand- 
point of  experience,  should  have  come  forward  with  the  feelings  of 
"and"  and  feelings  of  "if,"  purporting  to  find  relations  as  felt  rela- 
tions within  experience  itself.  Professor  James'  refutation  of  asso- 
ciational  psychology  is  evidence  that  the  assumption  on  which  it  rests 
is  open  to  question. 

New  realism  is  one  among  several  contemporary  movements  which 
take  the  view  that  many  of  the  problems  of  modern  philosophy  have 
remained  insoluble  chiefly  because  of  the  way  in  which  they  have  been 
stated.  If,  under  a  given  assumption,  they  are  incapable  of  solution, 
perhaps  the  trouble  lies  with  the  assumption. 

III.     THE  NEW  REALISM  IN  ENGLAND 

1.  In  1888  Thomas  Case  published  a  book  entitled  Physical 
Realism,  with  the  sub-title,  Being  an  Analytical  Philosophy  from  the 
Physical  Objects  of  Science  to  the  Physical  Objects  of  Sense. 

The  theory  of  Physical  Realism  as  brought  forward  by  Case  affords 
an  admirable  orientation  of  the  study  of  English  realism.  It  is  a 
pioneer,  though  stalwart,  protest  against  the  pre-supposition  of  ideal- 
ism. Psychological  idealism,  it  is  pointed  out,  began  with  the  suppo- 

13 


sition  of  Descartes  that  all  the  immediate  objects  of  knowledge  are 
ideas.  Every  form  of  idealism  rests  upon  the  common  postulate  that 
all  sensible  data  are  psychical.  Upon  such  an  hypothesis,  pure  ideal- 
ism is  the  only  logical  conclusion. 

The  theory  of  Physical  Realism,  as  the  sub-title  indicates,  takes 
its  start  with  the  results  of  science.  This  is  significant.  The  entire 
neo-realistic  movement,  as  we  shall  see,  is  characterized  by  a  healthy 
recall  of  philosophy  to  science.  Case's  book  opens  with  a  quotation 
from  Professor  Tait's  Recent  Advances  in  Physical  Science,  and  its 
closing  paragraph  is  headed  with  the  sentence,  "My  main  trust 
is  in  the  philosophy  of  science."  Natural  philosophy,  it  is  asserted, 
is  not  a  sham  and  the  whole  fabric  of  the  physical  world  is  not  an 
invention.  And  yet,  according  to  Case,  this  physical  world  known 
to  science  is  an  "insensible"  world,  we  can  have  no  immediate 
knowledge  of  it.  Real,  beyond  sense,  actual  in  nature,  it  must  remain 
an  inferred  world.  Not  only  is  the  world  of  physical  science  insensi- 
ble, but  portions  of  it  are  imperceptible,  as  for  example,  corpuscles, 
and  the  undulations  of  ether.  Now  the  idealistic  hypothesis,  main- 
taining that  the  immediate  data  of  knowledge  are  psychical,  is  totally 
inadequate  for  the  explanation  of  the  external  world  of  physical 
science.  The  physical  cannot  logically  be  inferred  from  the  psychi- 
cal. A  new  theory  is  required,  and  it  is  in  response  to  this  logical 
demand  originating  in  consequence  of  the  results  of  science  being 
taken  as  the  starting  point,  that  the  theory  of  Physical  Realism  is 
advanced. 

Physical  Realism  is  the  doctrine  that  the  immediate  data  of  sense 
are  physical  and  not  psychical.  The  immediate  object  is  the  nervous 
system  itself  sensibly  affected  by  external  objects.  The  sensible  ob- 
ject is  neither  identical  with  the  external  object  which  causes  it  nor 
with  the  internal  operation  of  consciousness  which  apprehends  it;  it 
is  neither  the  physical  object  without  nor  a  psychical  object  within; 
it  is  within,  but  physical.  The  results  of  physical  science,  it  is  held,  es- 
tablish the  fact  that  the  sensible  object  is  internal,  a  modification  of 
the  nervous  system  due  to  its  sensible  affection  from  external  causes. 
The  results  of  logic  establish  the  fact  that  it  is  physical,  homogeneous 
with  the  outer  object  of  which  it  is  representative,  for  in  no  other 
way  can  physical  objects  of  sense  be  inferred. 

There  is,  therefore,  numerical  duplicity  between  the  physical  ob- 
ject of  science  and  the  physical  object  of  sense.  Both,  however,  are 

14 


physical,  and  belong  to  the  same  order  of  reality.  The  transition 
from  one  to  the  other  is  unbroken  and  homogeneous.  There  is  no 
rupture  of  physical  continuity,  no  transformation  from  physical  to 
psychical. 

The  history  of  idealism,  as  we  have  seen,  marks  the  gradual  nb- 
sorption  of  content  on  the  part  of  consciousness,  an  absorption  end- 
ing in  complete  subjectivity.  With  Case  there  is  inaugurated  a  move- 
ment in  an  opposite  direction.  At  least  part  of  the  universe  of  con- 
tent, according  to  Case,  takes  its  place  outside  the  mind,  is  physical 
and  independent  of  the  psychical  operation  which  apprehends  it. 

2.  The  more  direct  impetus  to  the  English  neo-realistic  move- 
ment proper  is  given  by  Mr.  G.  E.  Moore.  Among  its  later  advo- 
cates are  Messrs.  Russell,  Nunn,  and  Alexander.  Mr.  Russell  affirms 
in  many  places  that  his  philosophical  position  is  derived  from  Mr. 
Moore,  and  Mr.  Nunn  acknowledges  indebtedness  to  both  Mr. 
Moore  and  Mr.  Russell. 

As  early  as  1899  Mr.  G.  E.  Moore  published  in  Mind  an  article 
entitled  "The  Nature  of  Judgment."  In  this  article  Mr.  Moore 
attacks  the  idealistic  logic  of  Mr.  Bradley.  In  Judgment,  according 
to  Bradley,  an  idea  is  predicated  of  reality.  Furthermore,  what  we 
have  above  loosely  termed  content  is  viewed,  on  the  assumption  of 
idealistic  logic,  as  a  quality  of  the  idea.  When  we  judge,  it  is  held, 
we  use  ideas  as  ideas,  and  when  we  have  an  idea  of  something,  the 
something  is  part  of  the  content  of  the  idea. 

This  intellectualistic  assumption  is  called  in  question  by  Mr. 
Moore.  The  something  about  which  a  judgment  is  asserted  is  other 
/than  part  of  the  content  of  the  idea  involved  in  the  assertion.  Mr. 
Moore  employs  the  word  "concept"  to  designate  any  entity  of  the 
universe.  They  are  not  mental  facts,  and  their  nature  is  in  no  sense 
dependent  upon  whether  any  one  thinks  them  or  not.  Concepts  are 
irreducible,  incapable  of  change,  and  independent  of  the  process  called 
thinking.  Any  "thing"  which  I  may  point  to  or  identify  is  a  complex 
of  concepts,  and  Mr.  Moore  assigns  to  this  complex  the  important, 
and  in  later  realistic  writings,  significant  term,  "proposition."  A 
proposition  is  a  synthesis  or  combination  or  complex  of  concepts.  A 
judgment  asserts  a  proposition,  and  the  proposition  about  which 
the  assertion  is  made  is  other  than  content  of  the  assertion.  A  propo- 
sition, therefore,  is  nothing  subjective  of  psychical.  Truth  and  falsity 

15 


are  immediate  properties  of  propositions.     Perception  is  the  cognition 
of  an  existential  proposition. 

Mr.  Moore  begins,  it  is  seen,  with  a  refutation  of  idealistic  logic. 
He  continues  with  a  refutation  of  idealism.*  All  idealistic  arguments, 
it  is  asserted,  involve  the  necessary  and  essential  Stcp,"tsse  est  percept" ; 
"being"  and  "being  experienced"  are  necessarily  connected;  whatever 
is  is  also  experienced.  Mr.  Moore  asserts  "that  the  most  striking 
results  both  of  idealism  and  agnosticism  are  only  obtained  by  identify- 
ing blue  with  the  sensation  of  blue:  that  esse  is  held  to  be  percipi 
solely  because  what  is  experienced  is  held  to  be  identical  with  the  ex- 
perience of  it."  Idealism  maintains  that  objects  of  sensations  are 
the  contents  of  sensations,  that  "existence"  and  "content"  are 
inseparable,  that  "blue"  is  related  to  the  "sensation  of  blue"  as  its 
content.  Such  an  assumption  is  claimed  to  be  "utterly  unfounded." 

In  opposition  to  the  idealistic  analysis  of  sensation,  we  have,  ac- 
cording to  Mr.  Moore,  the  true  analysis.  "In  every  sensation  or  idea 
we  must  distinguish  two  elements,  ( 1 )  The  object,  or  that  in  which 
one  differs  from  another;  and  (2)  'consciousness'  or  that  which  all 
have  in  common." 

In  the  first  place,  Mr.  Moore  contends  that  the  blue  "is  probably 
not  part  of  the  content  of  the  sensation  at  all."  What  the  idealist 
calls  "content"  is  an  "object,"  a  "thing,"  not  an  inseparable  aspect 
of  the  experience.  "Blue  is  as  much  an  object,  and  as  little  a  mere' 
content,  of  my  experience,  when  I  experience  it,  as  the  most  exalted 
and  independent  real  thing  of  which  I  am  ever  aware.  There  is, 
therefore,  no  question  of  how  we  are  to  get  outside  of  our  ideas  and 
sensations:  merely  to  have  a  sensation  is  already  to  be  outside  that 
circle.  It  is  to  know  something  which  is  as  truly  and  really  not  part 
of  my  experience,  as  anything  which  I  can  ever  know."  The  contents 
of  sensation  which  Case  localized  in  the  nervous  system  are  now  thrust 
beyond  the  body,  and  are  re-instated  as  physical  existences,  the 
real  status  of  which  is  unaffected  by  their  relation  to  consciousness. 

We  may  now  turn  to  the  other  element  present  in  every  sensa- 
tion, that  "in  respect  to  which  all  sensations  are  alike."  "The 
term  blue  is  easy  enough  to  distinguish,  but  the  other  element  which 
I  have  called  'consciousness' — that  which  the  sensation  of  blue  has  in 
common  with  sensation  of  green — is  extremely  difficult  to  fix  * 
and,  in  general,  that  which  makes  the  sensation  of  blue  a  mental 


*"Refutation  of  Idealism,"  Mind,  Vol.  12,  1903. 

16 


fact  seems  to  escape  us:  it  seems,  if  I  may  use  a  metaphor,  to  be 
transparent — we  look  through  it  and  see  nothing  but  the  blue."  Or, 
as  expressed  elsewhere  "it  seems  as  if  we  had  before  us  a  mere  empti- 
ness, when  we  try  to  inspect  the  sensation  of  blue,  all  we  can  see 
is  the  blue :  the  other  element  is  as  if  it  were  diaphoanous." 

Such  a  conception  of  consciousness  is  significant.  Two  points  must 
be  noted.  First  consciousnesss  "really  is  consciousness.  A  sensation 
is,  in  reality,  a  case  of  'knowing'  or  'being  aware  of  or  'experiencing' 
something.  When  we  know  that  the  sensation  of  blue  exists,  the  , 
fact  we  know  is  that  there  exists  an  awareness  of  blue."  Second,  the 
unique  element,  "awareness,"  present  in  every  sensation,  has  also  a 
unique  relation  to  the  other  element,  the  blue  or  the  object.  Con- 
sciousness has  to  blue  "the  simple  and  unique  relation  the  existence 
of  which  alone  justifies  us  in  distinguishing  knowledge  of  a  thing  from 
the  thing  known,  and  indeed  in  distinguishing  mind  from  matter." 

The  realistic  views  of  Mr.  Moore  are  further  elaborated  in  sub- 
sequent articles  published  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian 
Society  * 

We  may  cite  a  single  quotation  from  the  article  on  Kant's  Ideal- 
ism. "What  I  do  think  is  that  certain  objects  of  sensation  do  really 
exist  in  a  real  space  and  really  are  causes  and  effects  of  other  things 
And  one  other  thing  is  certain  too,  namely,  that  colours  and 
sounds  are  not  sensations;  that  space  and  time  are  not  forms  of  sense; 
that  causality  is  not  a  thought.  All  these  things  are  things  of  which 
we  are  aware,  things  of  which  we  are  conscious;  they  are  in  no  sense 
parts  of  consciousness.  Kant's  Idealism,  therefore,  in  so  far  as  it 
asserts  that  matter  is  composed  of  mental  elements,  is  certainly 
false.  In  so  far  as  it  asserts  this,  it  differs  in  no  respect  from  Berke- 
ley's and  both  are  false.! 

Mr.  Moore  believes  that  the  Idealist,  on  the  "esse  est  percipi"  as- 
sumption, is  unable  to  prove  that  Solipsism  is  not  true.  The  article 
on  "The  Nature  and  Reality  of  Objects  of  Perception"  is  concerned 
chiefly  with  two  questions:  1.  How  do  we  know  that  other  persons 
exist?  2.  How  do  we  know  that  any  particular  kind  of  thing 
exists  ? 


*Experience  and  Empiricism,  1902-1905,  p.  80. 
Kant's  leadism,  1903-1904,  p.  127. 

The  Nature  and  Reality  of  Objects  of  Perception,   1905-1906,  p.   68. 
The   Subject-Matter   of   Psychology,    1909-1910,   p.    36. 
fOp.  cit.  page  140. 

17 


The  answer  to  both  questions  is  the  same.  The  existence  of  other 
minds  and  of  objects  can  be  proved  only  on  the  ground  that  "sense 
contents"  do  exist.  If  "sense  contents"  as  idealism  maintains,  resolve 
themselves  into  perceptions,  one's  observations  of  his  own  perceptions, 
thoughts  and  feelings  do  not  afford  the  slightest  reason  for  believing 
in  the  existence  of  material  objects  or  other  minds.  Only  on  the 
ground  that  the  thing  perceived  exists  separately  from  the  perception 
of  it  can  the  contrary  of  solipsism  be  maintained. 

In  the  article  entitled  "The  Subject-Matter  of  Psychology,"  Mr. 
Moore  seeks  to  determine  what  kind  of  entities  are  mental  or  psychi- 
cal and  what  it  is  that  distinguishes  them  from  the  other  contents  of 
the  universe.  Accordingly  it  is  said  that  every  act  of  consciousness, 
as  distinguished  from  what  it  is  conscious  of,  is  a  mental  entity.  To 
be  a  mental  entity  is  to  be  an  act  of  consciousness,  and  this  is  the 
most  fundamental  meaning  of  mental.  But  besides  being  conscious, 
one  may  be  conscious  in  a  particular  way,  there  may  be  a  certain 
quality  or  tone  of  consciousness.  Although  as  Mr.  Moore  has  pointed 
out  in  the  analysis  of  sensation,  there  is  no  difference  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  blue  and  the  consciousness  of  green,  yet  there  is  a  very  sig- 
nificant difference  between  the  consciousness  in  willing  an  action 
and  merely  thinking  it,  between  liking  an  object  and  merely  seeing 
it.  As  a  third  sort  of  undoubtedly  mental  entities,  Mr.  Moore  men- 
tions "Any  collection  of  acts  of  consciousness  which  has  some  sort  of 
unity."  Such  and  only  such  entities  are  undoubtedly  mental.  Others, 
for  example,  the  mind  itself,  images,  and  contents  of  conscious  acts 
are  doubtful. 

It  is  in  connection  with  the  second  type  of  mental  difference  that 
Mr.  Moore's  position  seems  open  to  question,  namely  as  to  whether 
there  are  qualitative  differences  in  the  mode  of  consciousness.  So 
far  as  sensation  goes,  consciousness  is  that  in  respect  to  which  they  are 
all  alike.  Sensations  differ  only  in  respect  to  content.  The  con- 
sideration at  least  seems  plausible  that  perhaps  all  differences  may 
be  described  in  terms  of  content,  and  that  the  awareness  pertaining  to 
acts  of  believing  and  acts  of  willing  reveal  no  qualitative  differences 
whatsoever. 

In  the  history  of  idealism,  as  we  have  seen,  the  act  of  being  con- 
scious has  tended  more  and  more  to  absorb  the  content  element  and 
render  it  inseparable  from  itself.  We  are  beginning  to  see,  according 
to  realism,  a  movement  headed  in  the  opposite  direction.  Complete 

18 


subjectivism  represents  congestion  of  content.  For  lack  of  room,  an 
elaborate  epistemology  was  devised  to  give  the  content  the  appear- 
ance of  spatial  and  temporal  extensity.  This  congestion  was  partly 
relieved  when  Case  shoved  sense  content  into  the  nervous  system.  It  is 
further  relieved  when  Mr.  Moore  turns  it  completely  out  of  doors. 
The  movement  thus  started  will  not  stop  until  the  mind  is,  as  it  were, 
turned  inside  out.  For  subjectivism  we  shall  encounter  the  doctrine 
of  the  objective.  The  problem  then  will  be,  not  how  consciousness 
constitutes  reality,  but  how  reality  generates  consciousness. 

3.  The  realistic  views  of  Mr.  G.  E.  Moore  are  taken  over  by 
Mr.  Bertrand  Russell*  and  made  the  "premises"  for  the  de- 
velopment of  Symbolic  Logic.  It  is  Mr.  Russell's  opinion  chat 
the  obscurities  of  the  Philosophy  of  Mathematics  are  due  to  insuffi- 
cient assumptions.  The  tendency  of  idealism  has  been  to  regard 
mathematics  as  dealing  with  mere  appearance.  The  Kantian  doctrine 
that  space  and  time  are  a  priori  forms  of  sensibility  has  given  to 
mathematics  only  phenomenal  validity.  Such  a  view,  as  Mr.  Russell 
holds,  is  "capable  of  final  and  irrevocable  refutation."  All  mathemat- 
ics, it  is  pointed  out,  "deals  exclusively  with  concepts  definable  in 
terms  of  a  very  small  number  of  fundamental  logical  concepts."! 
All  mathematical  constants  are  "logical  constants;"  and  from  them, 
ultimate  and  indefinable,  all  mathematics  can  be  strictly  and  formally 
deduced. 

Mr.  Russell  is  at  once  anti-idealistic.  Logical  constants  are  i-ot 
forms  of  thought,  not  a  priori  institutions,  nor  Kantian  categories. 
The  discussion  of  indefinables,  he  tells  us,  "is  the  endeavour  to  see 
clearly,  and  to  make  others  see  clearly,  the  entities  concerned  in 
order  that  the  mind  may  have  the  kind  of  acquaintance  with  them 
which  it  has  with  redness  or  the  taste  of  a  pineapple. "$  The 
"constants"  are  to  be  defined,  we  are  told,  only  by  enumeration;  they 
are  obtained  "as  the  necessary  residue  in  a  process  of  analysis." 

In  the  matter  of  inference,  it  is  important  to  note,  Mr.  Russell 
holds  to  a  passive  psychology.  "But  it  is  plain  that  where  we  validly 
infer  one  proposition  from  another,  we  do  so  in  virtue  of  a  relation 


*cf.  Principles  of  Mathematics,  Vol.  I.  pp.  1-110.  Meinong's  "Theory  of 
Complexes  and  Assumptions,"  I,  II,  III,  Mind,  N.  S.  Vol.  XIII,  1904  ,in 
Proceedings  of  Aris.  Society.  Philosophical  Essays. 

•^Principles   of  Mathematics,  I. 

rjilbid,  p.  V. 

19 


which  holds  between  the  two  propositions  whether  we  perceive  it  or 
not:  the  mind,  in  fact,  is  as  purely  receptive  in  inference  as  common 
sense  supposes  it  to  be  in  perception  of  sensible  objects."* 

Mr.  Russell  states  in  the  Preface  to  the  Principles  of  Mathematics 
that  on  fundamental  questions  of  philosophy  his  position,  in  its  chief 
features,  is  derived  from  Mr.  G.  E.  Moore.  This  position  involves 
three  premises:  (1)  The  non-existential  nature  of  propositions;  (2) 
Their  independence  of  any  knowing  mind;  (3)  Pluralism  including  a 
doctrine  of  external  relations.  A  brief  elaboration  of-  these  three  posi- 
tions will  be  sufficient  to  indicate  the  essence  of  Mr.  Russell's  realism. 

In  the  first  place,  what  does  Mr.  Russell  mean  by  a  "proposition?" 
When  I  assert  any  judgment  there  is  always  the  assertion  and  some- 
thing about  which  the  assertion  is  made.  The  thing  asserted  is  the 
object  of  which  the  assertion  is  the  verbal  formulation.  Now  the 
object  of  a  judgment  is  what  Mr.  Russell  calls  a  proposition.  Prop- 
ositions except  those  which  are  linguistic,  do  not  contain  words;  they, 
contain  the  entities  indicated  by  words.  "If  I  say  'I  met  a  man,'  the 
proposition  is  not  about  a  man :  this  is  a  concept  which  does  not  walk 
the  streets,  but  lives  in  the  shadowy  limbo  of  the  logic-books.  What 
I  met  was  a  thing,  not  a  concept,  an  actual  man  with  a  tailor  and 
a  bank-account  or  a  public-house  and  a  drunken  wife."  fAny  complex 
whatsoever  that  can  be  pointed  to  or  mentioned  is  a  proposition. 
Mr.  Russell  further  designates  a  proposition  as  anything  that  is  true 
or  false.  Truth  and  falsehood  are  characteristics  exclusively  of  prop- 
ositions, they  depend,  not  upon  the  person  judging,  but  upon  the 
facts  about  which  the  judgment  is  made.  Every  judgment  must  have 
an  object  other  than  itself.  Following  Meinong,  the  objects  of  judg- 
ments are  called  "objectives."  All  objectives  are  propositions.  Some 
propositions  are  true  and  some  false,  just  as  some  roses  are  red  and 
some  white. 

In  the  second  place,  Mr.  Russell  holds  that  propositions  are  inde- 
pendent of  any  knowing  mind.  This  is  the  primary  and  essential 
thesis  of  realism.  It  may  be  variously  stated.  The  knowledge 
relation  is  an  external  relation;  knowing  makes  no  difference  to  the 
thing  known.  The  question  touching  the  nature  of  propositions, 
is,  Mr.  Russell  affirms,  distinct  from  the  question  of  knowledge.  The 
proposition  known  is  not  identical  with  the  knowledge  of  it,  and 
this  is  only  another  way  of  stating  that  psychical  processes  are  not  to 


*Ibid,  p.  31. 

•^Principles  of  Mathematics,  p.  53. 


20 


I 

be  confused  with  their  objects.  The  object  of  a  presentation  is  the 
actual  external  object  itself,  and  not  any  part  of  the  presentation. 
The  object  of  external  perception  is  not  in  the  mind  of  the  percipient ; 
it  is  a  wholly  extra-mental  thing,  an  outside  related  entity.  Every 
presentation  has  an  object  other  than  itself,  and  this  object,  except- 
where  mental  existents  are  concerned,  in  extra-mental.  Perception 
has  as  its  object  an  existential  proposition. 

The  widest  word  in  the  philosophical  vocabulary,  Mr.  Russell 
says,  is  the  word  term.  And  the  admission  of  many  terms,  he  holds, 
destroys  monism.  "Whatever  may  be  an  object  of  thought,  or  may 
occur  in  any  true  or  false  proposition,  or  can  be  counted  as 
one  I  call  a  term"*  A  man,  a  moment,  a  number,  a  class,  a  relation, 
or  anything  else  that  can  be  mentioned,  we  are  told,  is  sure  to  be  a 
term.  Pluralism  is  at  once  evident  when  we  consider,  further,  the 
characteristics  assigned  to  terms.  Every  term  is  immutable  and 
indestructible.  Every  term  has  numerical  identity  with  itself  and 
numerical  diversity  from  every  other  term.  What  a  term  is,  it  is, 
and  no  change  within  it  is  conceivable. 

The  category  of  subsistence  is  all-inclusive.  Every  term  has  being, 
it  subsists,  is  an  entity.  Terms  are  subdivided  into  "things"  and 
"concepts."  All  "things"  and  most  "concepts"  are  existents.  Some 
"concepts,"  however,  are  merely  subsistents,  as  for  example  the  false 
conclusions  of  a  syllogism.  It  does  possess  being,  however,  it  may  be 
an  object  of  thought,  it  may  be  mentioned,  is,  in  short  a  term.  Exist- 
ents, it  may  be  added,  may  be  either  mental  or  extra-mental.  But 
in  either  case  they  are  equally  independent  of  the  psychical  act  whichr 
apprehends  them. 

Mr  .Russell's  doctrine  of  relations  is  extremely  important  in  the 
history  of  realism.  There  are  two  opposing  theories  of  relations, 
known  as  the  theories  of  internal  and  external  relations.  The  doc- 
trine of  internal  relations  is  thus  expressed  by  Mr.  Russell:  "Every 
relation  is  grounded  in  the  natures  of  the  related  terms."  It  is  that 
relations  "modify"  their  terms,  that  when  two  objects  are  related 
there  is  something  in  the  "natures"  of  the  object  in  virtue  of  which 
they  have  the  relation.  Relations  exist  as  adjectives  of  their  terms, 
as  either  constituted  by  the  nature  of  the  terms,  or  as  grounded  in 
those  natures. 

The  two  connected  doctrines  of  logical  monism,  or  the  theory  that 
Truth  is  one,  and  ontological  monism,  or  the  theory  that  Reality 


*Prin.   of  Math.,  p.  43. 

21 


is  one,  are  logical  deductions,  it  is  asserted,  from  the  axiom  of  inter- 
nal relations.  And,  moreover,  the  axiom  of  internal  relations,  as 
evidenced  in  the  conclusions  of  Bradley,  leads  to  the  denial  of  relations 
all  together,  and  is  equivalent  to  the  assumption  of  one  final  proposi- 
tion with  one  subject  and  one  predicate. 

In  contrast  to  the  above  theory,  Mr.  Russell  holds  that  relations 
are  external,  that  they  possess  genuine  reality,  ' 'absolute  metaphysical 
validity."  "There  are  such  facts  as  that  one  object  has  a  certain 
relation  to  another  *  *  *  *  they  do  not  imply  that  the  two  objects 
have  any  complexity,  or  any  intrinsic  property  distinguishing  them 
from  two  objects  which  do  not  have  the  relation  in  question."*  There 
are  , therefore,  among  the  contents  of  the  universe,  distinct  ultimate 
entities  called  relations.  All  individual  relations  are  existents.  And 
no  relation  is  a  part  of  the  term  which  it  relates.  Relations  are  terms 
and  as  such  are  eternally  what  they  are.  The  internal  nature  of 
terms  is  not  changed  or  altered  by  virtue  of  possessing  relations,  but! 
all  terms  are  capable  of  sustaining  different  relations  at  different  times. 

4.  For  Mr.  Russell's  universe  of  terms,  Mr.  Nunnf  substitutes 
the  word  objective,  a  term  introduced  into  philosophy  by  Meinong 
and  adopted  later  by  Mr.  Russell  in  his  Philosophical  Essays. 

In  order  to  be  a  true  part  of  the  objective  any  content  whatsoever 
must  meet  a  primary  test.  The  essential  and  necessary  mark  of  the 
objective  is  "Priority"  to  and  "Independence  of"  our  thinking.  As 
secondary  marks  the  objective  is  characterized  by  "sameness  of  all" 
and  "relevance  to  purpose."  The  objective  represents  a  "pooling" 
of  a  common  part  of  our  experience  and  this  common  part  is  there 
to  be  "reckoned  with." 

What  are  the  actual  contents  of  the  objective?  An  inventory  does 
not  contain  everything  which  Mr.  Russell,  for  example,  held  to 
possess  Being,  everything,  that  is,  which  may  be  mentioned.  Mr. 
Nunn  maintains,  for  instance,  that  a  round  square  or  Colonel  New- 
come  are  not  contents  of  the  objective.  The  range  of  the  objective 
may  be  represented  by  the  following  scheme: 

(a.    Physical 

I  1.    hxistents     1  .     „      ,  •     , 
Objective  1    "   0  .   .  '  *•    Psychical 


Objective  existents  which  are  physical  include  both  Primary  and 


^Philosophical  Essays,  p.  161. 

•\Aims  of  Scientific  Method,  and  various  articles  in  Proceedings  of  the 
Aris.  Society,  especially  "Are  Secondary  Qualities  Independent  of  Percep- 
tion?" 1909-1910,  p.  191. 


22 


Secondary  qualities,  both  being  extra-mental.  Objective  existents 
which  are  psychical  include  mental  entities  as  distinguished  from 
cognitive  acts.  Both  a  "post"  and  my  "idea  of"  a  post  are  objective 
existents  and  meet  the  necessary  test  of  the  objective.  The  former 
does  because  it  is  there  as  a  post  whether  I  perceive  it  or  not;  the 
latter  because  it  would  have  its  particular  content  even  if,  Mr.  Nunn 
says,  I  do  not  happen  to  perceive  that  I  had  "had"  it.  As  examples 
of  objective  subsistents  may  be  mentioned  the  tangent  to  an  elipse, 
or  relations. 

We  have,  therefore,  a  precise  marking  off  of  the  limits  of  the 
objective  with  a  standard  test  of  objectivity.  The  objective  embraces 
all  primary  facts  as  data,  and  it  is  the  function  of  science  "to  render 
the  objective  in  its  actual  determination  intelligible."  The  pri- 
mary facts  as  interpreted  enter  into  an  apperceptive  system  and  thus 
form  "secondary  constructions." 

Mr.  Nunn's  realistic  position  is  summed  up  in  three  main  assertions: 
(1)  the  existence  of  primary  and  secondary  qualities  of  material 
bodies  independent  of  their  being  perceived ;  (2)  the  fact  that,  though 
never  given  except  under  conditions,  these  conditions  do  not  affect 
the  character  of  the  qualities;  (3)  the  uselessness  of  sensations  as 
mental  entities  endowed  with  a  "representative  function." 

Enough  has  been  said  touching  the  first  two  assertions  to  make 
their  meaning  sufficiently  plain.  The  third  assertion  implies  a  pre- 
sentative  theory  of  perception.  Mr.  Nunn  holds  that  in  sensation  one 
is  in  immediate  and  direct  contact  with  independent  reals.  That 
which  is  directly  present  to  the  mind  is  the  extra-mental  object,  the 
objective  physical  existent,  no  intermediate  psychical  existent  which 
some  how  functions  in  behalf  of  its  prototype.  In  perception  the  mind 
directly  encounters  the  thing  or  some  aspect  of  the  thing,  and  the 
existential  status  of  the  thing  perceived  is  in  no  sense  dependent  on  its 
presence  or  absence  in  some  one's  perception  of  it.  Perception  as 
a  cognitive  act,  breaks  up  into  two  elements,  the  thing  cognized, 
and  the  psychical  act  of  cognition.  The  act  of  cognition  contains 
only  the  element  of  "awareness."  All  the  content  is  extra-mental. 
Mr.  Nunn  starts  with  "the  recognition  that  in  perception  the  object 
announces  itself  as  having  a  certain  priority  to  an  independence  of 
our  act  and  that  this  announcement  is  itself  the  sufficient  certificate 
of  the  object's  extra-mental  status."* 


^Proceedings  of  Aris.  Society,  "Are  Secondary  Qualities  Independent  of 
Perception?"  1909-1910,  p.  201. 

23 


Now  realism,  in  holding  that  knowing  makes  no  difference  to 
what  is  known,  is  committed  to  a  passive  psychology.  The  content 
given  in  perception  is  read  off  as  presented.  In  perception  what  is 
presented  is  accepted  without  suspicion,  and  without  question.  The 
senses  do  not  deceive,  perception  is  infallible.  But  then  there  are 
such  contents  as  illusions,  hallucinations,  and  error.  Perception  is 
confronted  with  all  sorts  of  spatial  and  temporal  displacements  which 
endanger  the  position  of  realism.  The  entire  topic  of  illusory  and 
erroneous  experience  is  admirably  discussed  by  Professor  Montague 
and  Professor  Holt  in  The  New  Realism  and  it  seems,  therefore, 
unnecessary  to  enter  here  into  any  detailed  account  of  the  problem. 
Mr.  Nunn's  position,  however,  may  be  briefly  stated. 

Touching  the  problem  of  qualitative  differences,  any  object  actu- 
ally contains  all  the  various  qualities  attributed  to  it  by  different 
observers  under  different  conditions.  The  buttercup  really  owns 
all  the  colors  which  it  may  present  under  various  possible  conditions. 
The  staff  seen  bent  in  the  water,  so  far  as  its  visual  properties  are 
concerned,  really  is  bent.  The  visual  qualities  of  the  staff  under  the 
water  are  different  from  what  those  qualities  are  out  of  the  water. 
"Error  may  spring  either  from  ignorance  that  the  staff  is  partially 
in  water,  or  from  ignorance  of  the  visual  aspects  belonging  to  a 
straight  staff  in  these  circumstances."*  No  deviation  is  made  from 
the  rigid  realistic  position  that  "sensational  experience  carries  with  it 
a  guarantee  of  the  extra-mentality  of  its  content"  even  the  cases  of 
hallucinations.  Regarding  examples  like  the  "voices"  of  Joan  of  Arc, 
Mr.  Nunn  maintains  that  "the  evidence  at  least  warrants  the  specu- 
lation that  real  sensational  visual  and  auditory  characters  are  directly 
cognized  without  the  help  of  ordinary  mediating  machinery.! 

In  the  doctrine  of  objectivity  set  forth  by  Mr.  Nunn,  the  objective 
embraces  both  physical  and  mental  existents.  The  test  of  objectivity 
is  priority  to  and  independence  of  thinking.  Any  content  is  objective 
the  existence  of  which  is  not  dependent  upon  being  perceived. 

It  does  not  seem  to  me  that  Mr.  Nunn  can  apply  his  test  of  pri- 
ority and  independence  to  mental  existents.  If  there  be  such  entities 
as  mental  existents,  they  certainly  are  not  prior  to  and  independent 
of  their  being  perceived.  Mr.  Nunn  says  that  my  idea  of  a  post 
"would  be  an  idea  with  just  that  particular  content,  even  if  I  did 
not  happen  to  perceive  that  I  had  'had'  it."  Of  course  mental  exis- 

*Ibid.  p.  209. 
flbid.   p.  216. 

24 


tents  are  prior  to  and  independent  of  any  reflection  about  them.  My 
idea  of  a  post  may  exist  prior  to  and  independent  of  my  perception 
that  I  was  having  a  perception  of  an  idea  of  a  post,  but  it  does  not 
exist  apart  from  and  independent  of  the  operation  involved  in  the 
perceptive  process  in  which  it  occurs.  Mental  entities  are  products  - 
of  and  inseparable  from  the  very  acts  which  give  them  birth.  We 
may  add  another  operation  subsequent  to  the  one  which  is  simulta- 
neous with  and  constitutive  of  its  existence.  Either,  it  seems  to  me, 
mental  entities  do  not  exist,  or  we  must  put  them  down  as  Subjectives, 
if  I  may  capitalize  a  word.  If  they  exist  as  entities  they  have  no 
existence  independent  of  their  being  perceived,  and  as  such  are  sub- 
jective and  not  objective.  But  are  we  compelled  to  believe  there  are 
any  such  things  as  objective  psychical  existents  at  all?  Surely  I  have 
an  idea  of  a  post,  a  stone  post  with  a  horse  hitched  to  it.  It  is  also 
plain  that  the  content  which  I  am  thinking  of  is  not  created  by  my 
thinking  it,  for  I  cannot  by  thinking  bring  into  the  post  any  quality 
which  the  post  does  not  have.  I  can't  think  it  wooden  instead  of  stone, 
blue  instead  of  gray.  Then,  I  may  ask,  is  the  content  "psychical" 
content  at  all?  Haven't  I  been  all  the  while  thinking  about  the  post 
and  not  about  any  idea  at  all?  Of  course  the  difficulty  presents 
itself  as  to  how  I  can  think  about  an  actual  physical  object  which  is 
not  sensibly  present.  How,  I  am  sure  I  do  not  know,  but  somehow 
I  believe  that  I  do.  If  there  are  such  things  as  psychical  existents 
they  must  be  subjective,  not  subjective  in  the  sense  of  intra-mental, 
but  subjective  as  opposed  to  Mr.  Nunn's  objective;  subjective  in  the 
sense  that  they  do  not  exist  independent  of  being  perceived.  If  my 
memory  content  is  an  image-entity  separate  from  the  content  remem- 
bered, then  its  existence  is  identical  with  its  being  perceived.  But  I 
cannot  be  sure  that  such  contents  exist.  Either  they  do  not  exist,  or 
they  are  true  parts  of  the  Subjective. 

The  analysis  of  sensation  begun  by  Mr.  G.  E.  Moore,  consist- 
ing in  the  separation  of  the  sensation  into  the  object  of  which  we  are 
conscious,  and  the  consciousness  of  the  object,  the  former  being 
extra-mental,  the  latter  being  an  undifferentiated,  pure  transparent 
process,  is  pushed  to  its  furtherest  possible  limit  by  Mr.  Alexander.* 
Any  experience  whatever  which  may  be  termed  mental  experience 
is  characterized  by  a  fundamental  distinction  between  what  is  expe- 
'  rienced  and  the  act  of  experiencing.  In  all  mental  experience  there 

*Articles  in  Proceedings  of  Ar'is.  Society,  especially  "On  Sensations  and 
Images."    1909-1910,   p.    1. 

25 


is  this  polarization,  the  two  poles  representing  fundamental  distinc- 
tions of  every  experience.  There  is  the  act  of  apprehending  and  the 
something  apprehended,  the  act  of  judging  and  the  something  judged, 
the  act  of  remembering  or  imaging,  and  the  something  remembered 
or  imaged. 

The  something  experienced  is  always  other  than  the  mind  which 
experiences  it.  It  may  be  variously  termed  a  thing,  an  object,  a 
percept.  Mr.  Alexander  seems  to  prefer  the  term  "cognitum"  stand- 
ing for  anything  that  may  be  the  content  of  a  mental  operation.  The 
"cognitum"  is  extra-mental,  physical,  and  independent  of  the  act  in 
"comprescence"  with  which  it  invariably  occurs. 

The  significance  of  Mr.  Alexander's  doctrine  of  the  nature  of  the 
"cognitum"  is  its  extension  to  include  anything  which  in  any  sense 
may  be  an  object  or  content  of  a  mental  act.  The  contents  of  memory, 
imagination,  dreams,  illusions,  judgments  are  physical  and  extra-men- 
tal and  independent  of  the  mind  which  perceives  them. 

In  addition  to  the  "cognitum"  there  is  the  knowing,  the  thinking, 
the  mental  act,  which  may  be  termed  consciousness.  Consciousness 
is  simple,  homogenous  and  absolutely  void  of  any  qualitative  modality. 
It  has  no  specific  tone.  Experience  differs  only  with  reference  to  the 
"cognitum."  The  consciousness  of  blue,  of  an  imaged  tree,  or  of 
believed  truth  is  the  same  for  all.  Consciousness  is  mental  activity,  pure 
and  simple.  Consciousness,  however,  has  direction,  but  its  direction 
varies  solely  in  accordance  with  the  physical  object  to  which  its  activity 
is  directed.  Following  Mr.  Stout,  consciousness  is  one  with  conation. 
There  is  a  series  of  mental  movements  which  in  their  continuity 
constitute  consciousness.  Conation,  direction,  continuity,  are  the 
characteristics  of  consciousness. 

Such  are  the  two  elements  present  in  every  experience.  Their 
relation  to  each  other  is  simply  that  of  togetherness.  In  a  recent 
article  in  Mind*  Mr.  Alexander  uses  the  term  "compresence."  A 
table,  and  consciousness  of  the  table,  exist  together  in  precisely  the 
same  way  that  a  table  and  chair  are  said  to  be  together.  Touching 
the  relation  of  "compresence"  Mr.  Alexander  promises  to  write  more 
in  the  future. 

From  the  foregoing  sketch  of  idealism  and  English  realism,  the 

content  element  of  our  earlier  description   is  seen   to  be  somewhat 

migratory   in    its   disposition.     The   history   of   idealism   marks   an 

emigration.     Content  moves  from  the  physical  realm  to  the  psychi- 

*Mind,  January,  1912,  p.  2. 

26 


cal  realm.  But  consciousness  is  never  able  fully  to  assimilate  this 
foreign  material.  Just  because  the  content  of  which  I  am  conscious 
is  distinguished  from  the  act  of  being  conscious,  it  must  remain  outside 
and  alien  to  the  process.  In  consequence,  content  returns  to  be 
naturalized  within  the  domain  of  physics.  New  realism  is  in  a  sense 
an  ode  in  commemoration  of  the  return  of  primary  and  secondary 
qualities  to  their  own  native  heath. 

While  English  realists  differ  very  much  as  to  the  fixation  and  ob- 
jectivity of  contents,  that  all  agree  in  two  important  respects.  They 
all  agree  that  consciousness  is  a  psychical  act,  a  mental  entity,  a 
term.  So  far  as  the  act  of  being  conscious,  as  distinguished  from  the 
content  of  which  one  is  conscious,  is  concerned,  there  is  no  break 
with  the  traditional  conception  of  consciousness  as  an  operation. 
Furthermore,  perception  is  at  all  times  viewed  as  a  cognitive  opera- 
tion. It  is  a  case  of  knowing,  of  becoming  aware  of.  Consciousness 
is  an  invariable  element  of  all  sense  apprehension. 

But  if  consciousness  is  a  term,  it  must  sustain  some  sort  of  rela- 
tion to  the  other  terms  with  which  it  is  co-present.  The  mere  rela- 
tion of  togetherness  or  compresence  is  insufficient.  One  is  at  a  loss  to 
understand  how  such  a  purely  diaphanous  medium,  when  viewed 
as  a  mental  entity,  a  mental  term,  can  be  related  to  content  terms  of 
a  nature  entirely  other  than  itself.  If  consciousness  is  a  term  it  should 
be  possible  to  isolate  it  from  its  compresent  associates  and  identify 
it  as  such.  If  we  take  away  all  the  content  terms,  it  should  be  possi- 
ble to  discover,  by  an  empirical  analysis,  the  term  consciousness  as 
the  necessary  residue.  The  impossibility  of  such  an  analysis  seems 
to  indicate  that  perhaps  consciousness  isn't  a  term  at  all.  There 
seems  need,  therefore,  of  some  modification  in  the  primary  conception 
of  consciousness.  And  this  demand,  as  we  shall  see,  is  supplied  by 
the  American  realist  who  regards  consciousness,  not  as  a  term  but  as 
a  relation.  The  chief  characteristic  which  distinguishes  the  American 
realist  from  the  English  realist  is  the  relational  theory  of  conscious- 
ness. 

IV.    THE  NEW  REALISM  IN  AMERICA 

The  new  realism  in  America  has  consisted  largely  in  the  publica- 
tion of  various  articles  in  philosophical  journals.  Of  these  The  Journal 
of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and  Scientific  Method  contains  by  far  the 
greater  number  of  articles.  It  has  been  the  chief  organ  for  the  ex- 
pression of  the  new  realism.  The  first  public  indication  of  a  class 
spirit  or  school  was  the  publication  of  "The  Program  and  First 

27 


Platform  of  Six  Realists."*  These  realists  are  Edwin  B.  Holt, 
Walter  T.  Marvin,  W.  P.  Montague,  Ralph  Barton  Perry,  Walter 
B.  Pitkin,  Edward  Gleason  Spaulding.  The  new  realism  has  called 
forth  many  other  writers  in  its  partial  support  and  sympathy.  Chief 
among  these  is,  I  suppose,  Professor  Woodbridge. 

The  most  systematic  and  coherent  account  of  the  new  movement  is 
to  be  found  in  the  forth-coming  volume,  entitled,  The  New  Realism, 
by  the  same  editors  of  "The  Program  and  First  Platform."t  The 
publication  of  this  volume  renders  unnecessary  any  detailed  or  elab- 
orate exposition  of  the  new  realism  in  the  present  essay.  Professor 
Perry,  also,  in  his  book,  entitled  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies, 
a  volume  just  from  the  press,  devotes  an  appropriate  part  to  an  ac- 
count of  Realism. 

My  treatment  of  American  realism  will  consist,  therefore,  in  a 
topical  account  of  some  of  its  essential  theses. 

1.  Naive  realism  maintains  that  the  mind  directly  and  immediate- 
ly perceives  external  reality.  But  such  a  view  goes  only  a  little  way 
before  encountering  serious  difficulties.  The  illusions  of  sense  per- 
ception are  so  obvious  that  one  begins  to  question  such  immediate  and 
direct  presentation.  The  complications  arising  in  connection  with 
sensory  illusions,  hallucinations,  dreams  and  error  have,  historical- 
ly, been  taken  so  seriously  that  they  have  enforced  a  complete  abandon- 
ment of  naive  realism.  Owing  to  such  difficulties  the  transition 
was  made  from  presentative  to  representative  realism,  and  thence 
to  complete  subjectivism. £  Subjectivism,  furthermore,  necessitates  the 
improvision  of  an  epistemology  whose  function  has  been  to  re-objectify 
the  "content"  and  go  bail  for  its  validity. 

Is  it  inevitable  that  philosophy  should  have  been  compelled  to  take 
such  a  course.  If  in  the  end  it  is  necessary  to  improvise  an  episte- 
mology to  re-objectify  the  content,  wouldn't  it  have  been  simpler  never 
to  have  made  it  subjective  in  the  first  place?  In  so  far  as  subjectiv- 
ism is  held  to  be  a  forced  conclusion  of  "relativity"  is  it  not  possible, 
it  may  be  asked,  to  dispose  of  the  complications  that  were  seen  to  arise 
in  connection  with  sensory  illusions,  hallucinations  and  dreams  in  a 
less  radical  way?  Is  it  not  possible  to  go  back  to  the  fundamental 
position  of  naive  realism,  reinstate  the  existence  of  primary  and  sec- 


*Journal  of  Phil.,  Psy.,  and  Scientific  Method,  Vol.  VII,  1910. 

fDue  to  the  courtesy  of  Professor  Montague  I  have  been  allowed  access 
to  the  proof  sheets  of  this  volume 

Jcf.  W.  P.  Montague,  "The  New  Realism  and  the  Old,"  Journal  of  Phil. 
Psy.,  and  Scientific  Method,  Vol.  IX,  1912. 

28 


ondary  qualities  as  independent  "reals,"  and  withal  account  for  the 
difficulties  of  illusions  and  relativity,  and  that  too  without  abandon- 
ing a  presentative  theory  of  perception?  In  short,  may  we  not  go 
straight  to  the  object  without  sailing  around  on  the  epistemological 
circuit  ? 

New  realism  is  the  attempt  to  formulate  affirmative  answers  to 
the  above  questions.  It  is  above  all  a  polemic  against  subjectivism. 
Its  primary  contention  is  that  subjectivism  is  not  correlated  with  rel- 
ativity. And  by  subjectivism  the  new  realist  means  not  only  that 
type  of  idealism  which  views  its  content  as  intra-mental  like  Locke's 
* 'ideas,"  but  any  type  of  idealism  which  maintains  inseparable  connec- 
tion between  consciousness  and  its  content. 

2.     The  Relational  Theory  of  Consciousness. 

The  starting-point  of  contemporary  realism  in  America  consists 
in  a  modified  conception  of  consciousness,  a  conception  now  termed 
the  relational  theory  of  consciousness.  The  term  consciousness  has 
had  a  long  history,  and  has  been  made  to  stand  for  many  things.  One 
thing  in  its  history  is  obvious:  states  of  consciousness  have  tended 
more  and  more  to  be  separated  off,  set  over  against  and  contrasted 
with  conscious  acts.  The  more  this  distinction  of  content  from  act 
has  been  pressed,  the  less  has  the  term  consciousness  been  made  to 
imply.  In  English  realism  consciousness  has  evaporated  into  the  ele- 
ment of  mere  awareness. 

In  idealistic  philosophy  consciousness,  whatever  the  term  has  been 
intended  to  connote,  has  been  of  primary  significance.  It  has  been 
taken  to  be  the  essential  element  and  the  content  set  over  against 
it  has  been  viewed  as  secondary  to  and  dependent  on  it.  Conscious- 
ness, idealism  has  maintained,  is  antecedent  to  the  operations  upon 
it,  and  is,  consequently,  the  pre-condition  which  renders  experience 
possible.  Experience  could  not  be  organized  as  it  is  except  on  the  as- 
sumption of  consciousness.  Consciousness  is  logically  prior  to  con- 
tent and  necessary  for  its  relation  and  coherence. 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  is  consciousness  logically  prior  to  content 
and  somehow  authoritative  respecting  its  organization?  English 
realism  has  shown  that  awareness  is  at  best  only  compresent  with 
content.  Is  it  not  possible  to  go  a  step  further  and  to  maintain  that 
consciousness  is  not  even  on  a  level  with,  but  secondary  to  and  de- 
pendent on  content;  that  it  is  not  primary,  but  derivative;  that  it 
is  actually  generated  out  of  content?  Might  we  not  say  that  when 
content  develops  to  a  certain  degree  of  organization,  then  awareness 

29 


appears?  Consciousness  is  something  which  happens  when  contents 
are  related  in  a  specific  manner.  The  element  of  awareness  enters  the 
content  of  experience  as  a  factor  in  a  natural  process. 

Conscious  behavior  does  contain  the  element  of  awareness;  it  is 
consciousness  which  appears,  it  is  knowing  which  happens,  that  much 
empirical  analysis  reveals  and  so  no  violence  is  done  to  the  fact  of 
consciousness.  Awareness  stands  for  the  indubitable  fact  that  things 
not  only  are  but  are  known  to  be,  that  matter  somehow  gets  itself 
thought.  The  relational  theory  of  consciousness  accounts  for  this 
function  of  awareness  as  being  the  result  of  a  nervous  system  stand- 
ing in  certain  peculiar  relations  to  its  environment.  The  qualities 
of  the  objects  are  not  due  to  any  relations  between  a  nervous  system 
and  the  objects;  they  exist  separate  from  and  independent  of  any 
such  relation;  but  the  fact  that  they  are  known  to  exist,  is  the  ad- 
ditional factor  due  to  this  special  relation.  Awareness  is,  therefore, 
a  relation.  It  has  no  existence  prior  to  or  apart  from  the  terms  of 
the  relational  context  in  which  it  functions. 

The  relational  theory  of  consciousness  means  that  awareness  is  an 
external  relation.  Consciousness  as  an  external  relation,  further- 
more, carries  with  it  a  realistic  implication.  The  terms  related  are 
independent  of  the  relation  in  which  they  stand,  at  least  so  far  as 
awareness  goes.  That  relation,  at  all  events,  the  new  realist  asserts, 
is  external.  The  view  that  consciousness  is  an  external  relation  was 
first  systematically  formulated  by  Professor  Montague  who  takes 
the  view  that  the  relational  theory  of  consciousness  and  a  realistic 
theory  of  objects  mean  the  same  thing  though  approached  from  dif- 
ferent points  of  view.  Realism,  he  maintains,  is  the  logical  implica- 
tion of  such  a  theory  of  consciousness.*  Idealism  may  also  contend 
that  consciousness  is  a  relation,  but  it  would  maintain  it  to  be  an 
internal  relation,  a  relation  that  is,  where  the  terms  related  are  con- 
stituted by  the  relation.  Consciousness,  the  new  realism  maintains,  is 
a  relation  wholly  external.  Whatever  be  the  status  of  relations  in 
general,  awareness  or  the  function  termed  knowing,  is  an  external 
relation.  The  existence  of  the  terms  related  is  independent  of  the  re- 
lation; they  are  not  constituted  by  it.  Whenever  any  content  is 
said  to  be  known,  the  knowing  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  nature  or 
existence  of  the  content  known. 

Although   there  seems  to   be  very   general   agreement   among  the 

*cf.  W.  P.  Montague,  "The  Relational  Theory  of  Consciousness,"  Journal 
of  Phil.,  Psy.  ,and  Scientific  Method,  Vol.  II,  1905. 

30 


new  realists  that  consciousness  is  an  external  relation,  there  seems  to 
be  little  agreement  as  to  any  further  specification  of  the  nature  of  the 
relation.  Professor  Woodbridge,*  for  example,  would  hold  that 
consciousness  is  the  logical  relation  of  implication.  Among  the  many 
ways  in  which  contents  may  be  related,  one  is  the  relation  of  meaning, 
and  this  is  termed  consciousness.  Dr.  Montaguet  regards  conscious- 
ness as  a  form  of  energy.  The  unit  of  physiological  activity  is  the 
sensory-motor  arc.  Energy  is  transmitted  along  the  sensory  nerve, 
at  the  synapses  the  kinetic  energy  becomes  potential,  and  then  is  re- 
directed along  a  motor  nerve.  At  the  point  of  its  redirection  the  po- 
tential energy  exists  as  a  kind  of  intensive  stress  implicative  of  its 
course  and  it  is  with  this  transcendent  implication  that  Professor 
Montague  identifies  consciousness. 

The  relational  theory  of  consciousness,  it  at  once  becomes  evident, 
is  in  striking  contrast  to  the  view  taken  by  idealism.  The  neo- 
Kantians  cling  to  the  notion  of  consciousness  as  a  logical  necessity. 
It  is  for  them  the  sine  qua  non,  the  indispensable  condition  of  coherent 
experience.  Now  if  instead  of  viewing  consciousness  hypothetically  as 
a  postulate  necessary  to  ultimate  and  logical  explanation,  a  simple 
and  more  verifiable  account  of  it  can  be  given,  an  account  limiting 
consciousness  to  the  realm  of  concrete  experience,  then  prima  facie, 
one  is  inclined  to  accept  that  account.  A  natural  explanation  is 
preferable  to  a  supernatural  one  as  given,  for  example,  by  T.  H. 
Green.  If  the  function  for  which  the  existence  of  consciousness  is 
called  in  to  explain  can  be  accounted  for  within  experience  itself  then 
tio  go  outside  of  experience  is  a  work  of  supererogation. 

An  objector  may  say  that  the  relational  theory  of  consciousness 
does  not  explain  what  awareness  is.  It  may  be  answered  that  per- 
haps no  real  explanation  can  be  given  any  more  than  one  can  tell 
why,  under  conditions  which  may  be  fully  described,  an  explosion 
takes  place.  As  a  matter  of  observation  we  see  that  it  does  and 
that  is  all  there  is  to  it.  And  so  for  consciousness,  it  may  be  that 
a  description  of  its  genesis  is  its  definition.  At  any  rate,  the  rela- 
tional theory  differs  from  the  neo-Kantian  view  in  that  it  renders  the 
problem  of  the  nature  of  consciousness  approachable.  The  neo- 
Kantians  hold  that  consciousness  is  inexplicable,  but  indispensable,  and 


*Compare  "The  Nature  of  Consciousness,"  Journal  of  Phil.,  Psy.,  and 
Scientific  Method,  Vol.  II,  1905.  Also  "The  Problem  of  Consciousness"  in 
the  Garman  commemorative  volume. 

fCompare   "Consciousness   a  Form  of  Energy'  'in  the  James  memorial 
volume. 

31 


therefore  to  be  postulated.  The  problem  of  its  origin  or  nature,  by 
virtue  of  the  terms  in  which  it  is  stated,  is  forever  an  insoluble  and 
unapproachable  problem.  But  once  take  consciousness  out  of  the 
realm  of  hypothesis  and  put  it  in  the  realm  of  relation,  and  an  im- 
portant step  in  advance  is  taken.  The  problem  is  no  longer  stated 
in  terms  which  preclude  the  possibility  of  its  solution,  but  is  re-stated 
in  terms  open  to  investigation  and  discovery.  The  way  in  the  di- 
rection of  an  explanation  is  opened.  The  relational  theory  by  de- 
scribing the  conditions  of  the  origin  of  consciousness,  is  in  accord 
with  the  biological  method  that  the  problem  of  genesis  and  nature 
are  not  to  be  separated. 

Whether  or  not  we  agree  with  the  new  realist  in  affirming  that 
consciousness  is  an  external  relation,  a  view  containing,  as  we  shall 
later  see,  certain  difficulties,  we  may  certainly  agree  with  him  in  so 
far  as  his  doctrine  is  a  revolt  against  the  idealistic  view.  Conscious- 
ness is  not  logically  prior  to  or  the  pre-condition  of  the  contents  of 
which  there  is  consciousness.  It  is  something,  whatever  this  may  be, 
which  has  a  genesis  and  a  history.  And  it  is  subsequent  to,  dependent 
on,  and,  it  may  be  added,  in  the  interest  of,  the  conditions  which  de- 
termine its  occurrence.  Surely  no  event,  content,  or  process  in  the 
universe  is  so  remarkable  is  the  fact  of  consciousness.  Two  things 
are  evident,  and  from  which  two  conclusions  have  been  drawn,  and 
both  conclusions  seem  to  me  to  be  false.  From  the  fact  that  conscious- 
ness never  is  without  content,  it  has  been  concluded  that  content  never 
is  without  consciousness.  And  from  the  fact  that  the  function  of  con- 
sciousness is  to  know,  it  has  been  concluded  that  all  action  is  in  the 
interest  of  knowledge.  New  realism  is  significant  because  it  separates 
the  content  of  which  I  am  conscious  from  the  act  of  being  conscious 
of  it,  and  shows  the  existential  independence  of  the  former.  Profes- 
sor Dewey's  doctrine  of  instrumentalism  is  significant  because  it 
shows  that  sonsciousness  arises  in  the  interest  of  human  activity. 
3.  The  Doctrine  of  Independence. 

The  concept  of  independence  is  the  essential  thesis  of  realism. 
Much  confusion  has  arisen,  and  consequently  much  misdirected  criti- 
cism, as  to  what  is  meant  by  independence.  Professor  Royce,  for 
example,  in  his  critique  of  Realism*  takes  independence  to  mean 
unr elatedness.  Since,  it  is  urged,  it  is  impossible  to  find  any  entity 
which  might  not  stand  in  some  relation  to  another  entity,  an  inde- 
pendent "real"  in  the  sense  of  an  unrelated  term  does  not  exist.  But 

*The  World  and  the  Individual.     Series  I.     Lecture  III. 

32 


the  neo-realistic,  however,  by  independence  does  not  mean  non-rela- 
tion. Whether  or  not,  as  the  monist  contends,  all  things  are  inter- 
related, many  things  certainly  are,  and  it  is  conceivable  that  all  may 
contain  at  least  the  possibility  of  sustaining  an  infinity  of  relations. 

The  case  against  independence  is  put  more  strongly  by  Mr.  Brad- 
ley. "If  a  thing  is  known  to  have  a  quality  only  under  certain  con- 
ditions, there  is  no  process  of  reasoning  from  this  which  will  justify 
the  conclusion  that  the  thing,  if  unconditioned,  is  yet  the  same  * 
If  the  quality  in  question  is  non-existent  for  us  except  in  one  rela- 
tion, then  for  us  to  assert  its  reality  away  from  the  relation  is  more 
than  unwarranted."*  Mr.  Bradley 's  difficulty  arises  because,  on  his 
assumption,  knowledge  is  not  separated  from  what  is  known  .  No 
one  can  deny  that  knowledge  is  determined  by  the  mechanism  of  per- 
ception, that  it  is  conditioned  by  the  human  nervous  system.  Qualn 
ties  of  matter  are  not  known  except  when  related  to  a  perceivingt 
organism.  If  then,  by  hypothesis,  knowledge  and  content  known  are 
identical,  Mr  .Bradley  is  correct  in  his  conclusion.  But  it  is  the  essen- 
tial mark  of  new  realism  to  distinguish  knowledge  and  content  known. 
Knowledge,  or  awareness,  as  the  neo-realist  betetr  uses  the  term,  is- 
conditioned,  but  content  known  is  unconditioned.  Awareness  is  de- 
pendent; but  the  content  of  which  I  am  aware  is  independent  of 
consciousness. 

The  doctrine  of  independence  is  to  be  stated,  therefore,  in  terms 
of  the  separation  of  knowledge  from  what  is  known.  It  rests  upon^ 
the  distinction  between  existence  and  known  existence.  Content  so 
far  as  existence  is  concerned  is  unconditioned,  but  known  existence 
is  conditioned  so  far  as  the  knowing  is  concerned.  In  defining  the 
concept  of  independence  complications  arise  with  respect  to  the  aware- 
ness element.  Awareness,  we  are  told,  is  generated.  Obviously  one 
begins  to  inquire  into  the  conditions  of  its  generation.  The  content 
is  independent  of  awareness,  but  awareness  is  not  independent  of  con- 
tent. Consciousness  is  a  gift,  but  the  giver  is  under  no  obligations  for 
what  he  gives.  Expressed  in  physical  terms,  consciousness  is  gen- 
erated, but  no  energy  is  expended  in  its  generation.  Independence, 
accordingly  must  be  defined  in  such  a  manner  that  it  holds  between 
content  and  awareness,  but  applies  only  to  content. 

We  may  quote  the  definition  of  independence  given  by  Professor 
Perry.  The  realistic  doctrine  of  independence  "means  that  things  may 
be,  and  are,  directly  experienced  without  owing  either  their  being  orv 
their  nature  to  that  circumstance.  *  *  *  *  According  to  realism,  ex- 

*Bradley,   Appearance  and  Reality,  p.   16. 

33 


perience  may  be  expressed  as  (a)  Re  Where  a  is  that  which  is  ex-- 
perienced,  and  Re  the  experience-relation ;  and  where  a  is  independent 
of  Re"*  If  independence  be  called  a  relation,  it  is  an  asymmetrical 
on  non-reciprocal  relation. 

It  has  been  pointed  out  that  independence  does  not  mean  unrelated- 
ness.  Any  complex  may  sustain  different  relations  at  different  times. 
And  it  seems  obvious  that  when  any  content  takes  on  a  new  rela- 
tion it  is  different  by  that  much  from  what  it  was  before.  It  is  de- 
pendent an  the  new  relation  to  the  extent  that  it  was,  in  its  pre- 
existing state,  susceptible  to  sustaining  its  subsequently  acquired  rela- 
tion. Now  knowing  is  an  external  relation  which  any  complex, 
under  appropriate  conditions,  may  assume.  Surely  content  and  known 
content  are  different,  but  the  difference  is  precisely  like  the  difference 
which  any  relational  addition  makes  to  the  content  which  assumes  it. 
Awareness  is  something  which  happens  to  content  just  as  a  thunder- 
storm happens  to  the  pre-existing  elements  involved.  It  represents 
a  new  relational  context.  The  susceptibility  on  the  part  of  content  to 
assuming  the  knowing  relation  is  not  qualitatievly  different  from  its' 
capacity  to  assume  any  other  external  relation. 
4.  Emancipation  of  Metaphysics  from  Epistemology. 

Neo-realism  is  primarily  a  revolt  against  subjectivism,  consequent- 
ly its  initial  conclusions  are  mainly  negative.  But  not  entirely  so,  for 
the  arguments  adduced  in  opposition  to  subjectivism  involve  a  posi- 
tive platform. f 

The  most  notable  feature  of  new  realism  according  to  Professor 
Marvin,  is  the  emancipation  of  metaphysics  from  epistemology.  The 
claim  has  often  been  put  forward  that  epistemology  is  fundamental  to 
all  the  other  sciences.  The  history  of  modern  philosophy  furnishes  am- 
ple evidence  of  the  existence  of  such  a  claim. 

In  contrast  to  the  faith  which  new  realism  places  in  the  results 
of  science  may  be  cited  a  passage  from  the  Preface  to  the  1911  edi- 
tion of  Karl  Pearson's  Grammar  of  Science.  "Nobody  now  believes 
that  science  explains  anything ;  we  all  look  upon  it  as  a  shorthand  de- 
scription, as  an  economy  of  thought.  *  *  *  *  It  seems  almost  unneces- 
sary now  to  republish  a  book,  the  lesson  of  which  is  that  objective 
force  and  matter  have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  science,  and  that 
atom  and  ether  are  merely  intellectual  concepts  solely  useful  for 
the  purpose  of  describing  our  perceptual  routine.  *  *  *  *  Or,  again, 
may  there  not  be  some  danger  that  the  physicist  of  to-day  may  treat 

*Perry,    Present   Philosophical    Tendencies,   p.    315. 

tCompare  "The  Program  and  First  Platform  of  Six  Realists,"  Journal 
of  Phil.,  Psy.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  VIL,  1910. 

34 


his  electron,  as  he  treated  his  old  unchangeable  atom,  as  a  reality  of 
experience*  and  forget  that  it  is  only  a  construct  of  his  own  imagina- 
tion?" The  facts  of  science  according  to  Pearson,  are  "constructs" 
formed  from  "the  union  of  immediate  sense-impressions  with  associated 
stored  impressions,"  and  "its  field  is  essentially  the  contents  of  the 
mind."f  Now  the  new  realist  is  filled  with  the  overwhelming  con- 
viction that  the  facts  of  science  are  not  mental  content  and  that  they 
exist  in  total  independence  of  the  mind  which  discovers  and  investi- 
gates them. 

That  epistemology  is  fundamental  means,  Mr.  Marvin^  points 
out,  three  things.  1.  Logical  priority;  2.  Ability  to  infer  the  limits 
of  possible  knowledge;  3.  Ability  to  give  a  theory  of  reality. 

New  realism  maintains,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  theory  of  knowl- 
edge is  not  logically  prior  to  the  special  sciences,  but  is  rather  to 
be  viewed  as  one  of  them.  It  is  a  science  which  studies  knowledge 
as  physics,  for  example,  studies  light.  On  the  basis  of  the  relational 
theory  of  consciousness,  if  for  no  other  reason,  the  realist  is  entitled 
to  maintain  that  a  theory  of  knowledge  is  logically  subsequent  to 
content  known,  and  is  thus  based  upon  physics  and  biology.  Since 
knowing  is  something  which  is  generated,  a  theory  of  knowing  must 
assume  the  generating  environment. 

Realism  has,  with  equal  force,  the  right  to  contest  the  claim  that 
epistemology  may  set  the  bounds  to  possible  knowledge.  Much  of 
modern  philosophy,  especially  the  writings  of  Locke  and  Kant,  has 
dealt  precisely  with  this  topic.  An  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Under- 
standing has  as  one  of  its  essential  tasks,  according  to  Locke,  the  at- 
tempt to  fix  the  limits  of  knowledge.  The  realist's  right  to  question 
such  high-handed  dispensations  is  based  upon  his  thesis  of  inde- 
pendence, the  essential  thesis  of  realism.  If  the  content  known  is  in- 
dependent of  its  being  known,  then  obviously  it  is  there  to  be  dis- 
covered, and  only  an  empirical  discovery  can  reveal  the  limits  of  what 
exists.  Knowing  being  an  external  relation,  an  inquiry  into  it  as 
such,  is  incapable  of  revealing  anything  whatever  touching  the  con- 
tents related. 

That  the  theory  of  knowledge  is  taken  to  be  fundamental  rests, 
according  to  Mr.  Marvin,  on  the  error  of  idealistic  logic,  or  indeed 
on  any  logic  which  takes  as  its  task  a  study  of  the  laws  of  thought. 

*Italics  mine. 

•^Grammar  of  Science,   1911   edition,  p.  78. 

$cf.    Mr.  Marvin's  Essay  in  The  New  Realism  on  "The  Emancipation  of 
Metaphysics   from  Epistemology." 

35 


It  is  plain  that  if  the  mind  has  laws  of  thought  of  its  own  which  it 
follows,  and  which  antedate  the  content  upon  which  they  operate,  then 
a  study  of  these  laws  is  logically  prior  to  a  study  of  the  contents  of 
any  of  the  sciences.  And  further,  if  these  laws  are  of  universal  char- 
acter, then  a  knowledge  of  their  form  may  determine  the  nature  of 
the  content  to  which  they  apply.  Only  such  content  may  be  known 
which  fits  the  knowing  form.  If  there  are  categories  of  thought, 
by  all  means  study  those  categories  first.  But  here  neo-realism  appears 
with  a  new  logic. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  new  realism  in  England  began  with 
the  publication  by  Mr.  G.  E.  Moore  of  an  article  on  the  "Nature  of 
Judgment"  in  which  opposition  was  asserted  to  idealistic  logic.  Fol- 
lowing Mr.  Moore,  Mr.  Russell  has  asserted  that  the  mind  is  as 
purely  passive  in  inference  as  common  sense  supposes  it  to  be  in  per- 
ception. Propositions  are  complexes  entirely  independent  of  any 
knowing  process.  The  subject  matter  of  any  science  is  concerned 
with  the  terms  occurring  in  the  system  of  propositions  which  consti- 
tute its  field  of  inquiry.  The  propositions  with  which  logic  is  con- 
cerned, new  realism  asserts,  are  as  "non-mental  as  rocks  and  ocean 
currents."  One  proposition  implies  another  whether  or  not  any  one 
asserts  the  implication.  "Logic,"  Mr.  Marvin  says,  "is  not  a  science 
of  the  knowing  process.  Its  principles  and  formulae  are  not  laws  of 
thought.  Its  terms  and  relations  are  as  clearly  distinct  from  those 
of  thought  as  are  the  terms  and  relations  of  physics."  It  is  not  meant 
to  deny  that  epistemology  has  an  important  place  to  fill  and  function 
to  perform.  What  is  meant  is  that  the  so-called  laws  of  thought  are 
not  laws  of  thought  at  all,  but  laws  of  things.  But  the  discovery  and 
formulation  of  those  laws  and  their  bearing  upon  human  activity  is 
still  a  highly  important  task. 

The  emancipation  of  metaphysics  from  epistemology  means  in  the 
third  place,  the  inability  of  epistemology  to  give  a  theory  of  reality. 
It  is  maintained  that  the  issue  of  new  realism  is  independent  of  onto- 
logical  questions,  that  it  is  confined  solely  to  the  relations  obtaining 
between  knowing  and  the  something  known.  The  something  known 
it  is  asserted,  may  be  spiritual  or  material,  but  new  realism  is  interested 
only  in  ascertaining  whether  its  spiritual  or  material  status  is  effected 
by  its  becoming  known. 

Such  a  position,  it  is  clear,  is  a  deduction  or  conclusion  based  upon 
the  realistic  doctrine  that  knowing  is  an  external  relation.  It  rests  on 
the  assumption  that  content  does  exist  independent  of  process.  If  it 

36 


be  admitted  that  the  content  known  is  not  identical  with  the  knowl- 
edge of  it  then  the  ontological  question  touching  the  nature  of  the 
content  is  distinct  from  the  question  touching  the  nature  of  the  rela- 
tions obtaining  between  the  two  elements. 

Such  a  position  is  in  a  marked  contrast  to  idealism.  If  knowing 
is  a  psychical  act,  and  if,  on  the  theory  of  internal  relations, 
what  is  known  owes  its  existence  to  the  fact  of  knowing,  then 
that  does  imply  a  metaphysical  theory  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
something  known.  If  the  relations  are  internal  then  the  terms  con- 
stituted by  the  relation  are  at  least  homogeneous  with  the  relation, 
and  to  that  extent  there  is  a  metaphysic. 

And  yet  on  the  supposition  that  the  cognitive  relation  is  external, 
the  question  arises  for  the  realist  as  to  whether  the  doctrine  of  the 
externality  of  the  cognitive  relation  applies  to  the  entire  universe  of 
content,  or  whether  content  splits  up  into  two  divisions,  one  to  which 
the  doctrine  of  the  externality  of  the  cognitive  relation  is  applicable, 
and  one  to  which  it  is  not.  If  the  latter  alternative  is  true,  then  there 
is  some  conent  which  does  owe  its  existence  to  its  being  known,  and 
some  which  does  not.  And  to  the  extent  of  that  difference  there  is 
a  metaphysical  implication.  Only  on  the  supposition  that  all  content 
is  independent  of  its  being  known,  can  it  be  maintained  that  new 
realism  is  solely  an  epistemological  inquiry.  And  not  all  realists 
held  this  view.  Professor  Perry,  for  example,  holds  that  moral 
values  are  constituted  by  consciousness.  And  Prof.  Montague  would 
maintain  that  pleasure  and  pain  do  not  eixst  apart  from  consciousness. 
The  content  felt  cannot  be  distinguished  from  the  act  of  feeling  it. 
5.  Tendency  Toward  Pluralism. 

The  tendency  of  neo-realism,  it  is  further  contended,  is  in  the  di- 
rection of  pluralism.  We  have  already  seen,  in  the  study  of  Mr. 
Russell,  that  monism  rests  upon  the  theory  that  relations  are  internal. 
This  theory  is  reaffirmed  by  the  American  realists  and  the  universality 
of  cognition  is  added  as  a  second  ground  for  monism. 

The  most  effective  weapon  of  idealism  is  its  contention  that  it  is 
impossible  to  escape  the  cognitive  relation.  This  is  a  crucial  problem  in 
connection  with  idealism  and  realism.  The  issue  of  neo-realism  is, 
it  may  be  repeated,  an  issue  respecting  the  nature  of  the  relations  hold- 
ing between  knowing  and  the  content  known.  This  issue  involves  two 
considerations  which  must  be  carefully  separated.  The  first  pertains  to 
the  determination  of  whether  or  not  a  universe  of  content,  or  some  por- 
tion of  it,  is  invariably  compresent  with  awareness.  Common  sense  is 

37 


inclined  to  suppose  that  some  contents  at  least  occur  as  independent  en- 
tities quite  apart  from  any  one's  knowledge  of  them.  The  thing  which 
is  now  known  continues  to  exist  when  it  is  no  longer  known.  The  issue 
here  involves  the  independent  existence  of  contents  in  the  absence 
of  the  element  of  "awareness."  And  also  the  further  question,  if  the 
content  element  does  exist  apart  from  awareness  in  a  context  beyond 
the  possibility  of  its  influence,  does  it  undergo  any  modification  when 
it  occurs  in  the  same  context  with  it?  The  second  consideration  has 
reference  to  the  situation  termed  conscious  behavior.  In  this  situa- 
tion the  two  elements  are  certainly  together.  The  problem  here  is 
to  examine  the  nature  of  and  relations  between  the  two  elements 
in  the  situation  in  which  they  both  occur. 

Now  the  former  consideration,  idealism  asserts,  it  is  useless  to 
discuss.  What  the  content  is  outside  of  a  conscious  situation  it  seems 
impossible  to  say,  for  the  moment  you  have  said  anything  about  it, 
you  have,  ipso  facto,  brought  it  within  a  conscious  situation  and  made 
it  an  element  compresent  with  consciousness.  It  is  altered  at  least 
to  the  extent  that  is  now  thought  of  when  befofre  it  was  not.  Thd 
content  may,  for  all  we  know,  flit  in  and  out  of  a  conscious  situation. 
When  it  is  in,  it  is  compresent  with  consciousness;  when  it  is  out,  the 
situation  is  no  longer  open  to  observation.  The  only  legitimate  issue, 
according  to  the  position  of  the  idealist,  is  an  attempt  to  determine 
the  nature  of  content  and  process  and  their  relations  to  each  other  in 
the  situation  in  which  they  both  do  occur. 

The  fact  that  knowing  is  the  universal  form  which  all  conscious 
behavior  takes  has  been  termed  by  Professor  Perry  "the  Ego-centric 
Predicament."  This  predicament,  however,  at  best  may  limit,  but 
is  not  destructive  of  realism.  The  error  of  idealism  is  to  suppose 
that,  because  consciousness  is  present  as  an  element  in  all  conscious 
behavior,  all  the  other  elements  are  of  the  same  metaphysical  consti- 
tution as  the  stuff  of  consciousness.  It  is  wrong  to  suppose  that 
because  consciousness  is  an  invariable  accompaniment  of  cognitive 
behavior,  therefore  the  entire  situation  is  resolved  into  consciousness. 
Idealism  does  not  separate  knowing  from  the  something  known. 
It  resolves  the  latter  into  the  former.  The  realist  may  still  maintain 
that  within  the  bounds  of  the  cognitive  situation  content  is  indepen- 
dent of  consciousness. 

But,  in  view  of  two  considerations,  the  realist  may  go  further. 
The  cognitive  situation  is  undoubtedly  the  starting  point  for  reflective 
observation.  It  is,  furthermore  open  to  investigation  and  analysis. 

38 


And  such  analysis  soon  reveals  the  fact  that  the  content  which  figures 
in  my  cognitive  context  is  also  an  element  in  the  history  of  the  world. 
I  do  not  have  to  transcend  my  cognitive  behavior  to  find  that  the 
same  content  may  function  in  two  sets  of  relations.  What  the  content 
is  in  another  context  may  be  the  very  thing  of  which  I  am  now  con^ 
scious.  Furthermore,  and  this  is  the  main  contention  of  realism, 
from  an  analysis  of  the  content  in  a  cognitive  situation,  arises  the 
concept  of  its  independence.  From  the  way  in  which  content  behaves 
in  a  conscious  situation  it  is  discovered  to  be  independent  of  the  act 
which  cognizes  it.  The  concept  of  independence,  when  applied  to 
the  content  in  a  cognitive  context  is  such  that  it  may  be  applied  to 
the  same  content  or  any  content  when  not  in  a  cognitive  context.  The 
existence  of  contents  apart  from  cognitive  acts  is  a  legitimate  inference 
based  upon  an  analysis  of  the  concept  of  independence,  the  concept  of 
independence  arising  in  the  first  instance  from  an  empirical  analysis 
of  a  cognitive  situation. 

Monism,  in  the  second  place,  rests  upon  the  theory  that  all  relations 
are  internal.  New  realism  is  as  much  opposed  to  the  doctrine  that  all 
relations  are  intrinsic  as  it  is  to  a  deduction  of  monism  from  the 
thesis  of  the  universality  of  cognition.  Realism,  however,  is  not 
openly  pluralistic.  A  thoroughgoing  pluralism  is,  it  seems,  committed 
to  the  thesis  that  all  relations  are  external.  This  view  is  certainly 
held  by  Mr.  Russell,  and  among  American  realists,  Professor  Holt 
seems  avowedly  committed  to  such  a  view.  The  new  realist,  however, 
is  most  interested  in  the  declaration  that  knowing  is  an  external 
relation,  whatever  be  the  status  of  other  relations. 

There  seems  need,  on  the  part  of  new  realists,  for  a  more  careful 
analysis  of  the  doctrine  of  relations.  Independence,  as  we  have  seen, 
does  not  mean  unrelatedness.  There  are,  according  to  realism,  certain 
simple  entities,  ultimate  terms  of  experience,  entities  "at  large,"  as 
Professor  Perry  calls  them,  which  are  independent  of  all  relations 
whatsoever.  So  far  as  relation  applies,  it  must  apply  to  the  complexes 
which  are  formed  out  of  the  atomic  entities. 

Leaving  knowledge  as  an  external  relation  aside,  we  may  raise 
a  question  as  to  whether  all  physical  relations  are  external.  That 
some  are  seems  obvious.  When  I  say  the  picture  is  on  the  table,  the 
relation  on-ness  makes  no  difference  to  the  picture.  Now  in  the  form- 
ation of  complexes  it  seems  plain  that  some  relations  are  also  internal. 
An  external  relation  is  one  that  makes  no  difference  to  the  terms 
which  it  relates,  an  internal  relation  is  one  that  does  make  a  difference 

39 


to  the  terms  which  it  relates.  It  seems  clear  that  certain  qualities 
which  are  found  in  physical  complexes  owe  their  peculiar  tone  to  the 
relations  in  which  they  stand.  We  may  take,  for  example,  three 
graduated  complexes,  a,  b,  and  c.  B  we  say  is  large  in  relation  to  a. 
We  are  not  concerned  with  the  logical  difficulty  of  how  the  same 
complex  can  be  both  large  and  small  at  the  same  time;  it  may  be 
when  figuring  in  different  relational  contexts.  The  issue  is  whether 
or  not  the  property  of  the  complex  is  constituted  by  its  relational 
context.  We  certainly  do  consider  the  attributes  "large"  and  "small" 
as  belonging  to  the  complex  to  which  they  are  attributed.  Largeness 
is  a  quality  or  adjective  belonging  to  b,  and  it  is  that  in  virtue  of  its 
relation  to  c.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  absolute  largeness  or  small- 
ness.  They  are  relative  terms  depending  upon  the  context  in  which 
they  occur. 

The  same  thing  is  true  when  we  say  that  a  physical  object  changes 
its  color  when  seen  in  different  lights.  The  brick  wall,  when  seen 
in  the  morning  with  the  sun  shining  on  it,  is  light  grey;  when  seen 
in  the  affternoon  with  a  shadow  cast  over  it,  is  dark  grey.  Indeed 
we  may  be  sure  that  no  two  people  ever  perceive  quite  the  same  con- 
tent. There  is  sameness,  at  least  so  far  as  numerical  identity  of  the 
complex  is  concerned,  but  the  qualitative  differences  are  as  numerous 
as  the  different  relations  in  which  the  complex  stands.  Qualitative 
difference  is  no  evidence  for  subjectivity,  but  it  is  evidence  in  support 
of  internality  of  physical  relations.  It  is  hard  to  see  how  it  is  to  be 
accounted  for  in  any  other  way.  Physical  complexes  are  not  immutable 
reals  impervious  to  the  physical  influences  playing  upon  them;  on  the 
contrary,  they  take  up  these  influences  and  express  them  in  their 
own  natures.  The  qualities  "larger  than"  and  "brighter  than"  are 
not  psychological  contributions  of  judgment,  but,  according  to  the 
realistic  logic,  they  are  qualities  of  the  thing  about  which  the  asser- 
tion is  made.  So  far,  therefore,  as  adjectives  are  expressive  of  the 
variable  states  of  physical  objects,  their  variation  is  due  to  the  consti- 
tutive character  of  relations. 

And  we  may  go  beyond  the  secondary  qualities.  When  I  say  the 
day  is  gloomy,  the  gloominess  is  as  much  a  part  of  the  day  as  the 
rain  or  the  wind.  Many  terms  enter  into  the  constitution  of  a  day. 
Among  them  one  is  my  body.  And  part  of  what  the  day  is,  it  seems 
plain,  is  due  to  the  fact  my  body  is  one  of  the  factors  entering  into 
its  composition.  Gloominess  is  not  a  state  of  mind,  it  is  an  actual 
quality  belonging  to  the  day.  My  body  is  not  only  a  term  figuring 

40 


in  a  relational  context,  but  it  functions  in  a  peculiar  way.  It  may  be 
an  affective  term,  and  hence  productive  of  "tertiary  qualities."  I  not 
only  react,  but  I  may  react  emotionally,  that  is,  under  a  condition  of 
stress  and  strain. 

When  this  view  is  pressed  it  has  interesting  connections  with  the 
element  termed  awareness.  Awareness  is  something,  we  are  told, 
which  happens  to  pre-existing  things.  It  is  not  constitutive  of  terms, 
but  the  terms  are  constitutive  of  it.  If  awareness  is  a  quality  gener- 
ated by  the  other  physical  qualities,  then  the  relations  functioning 
in  the  context  in  which  it  is  generated  seem  to  be  internal  relations. 
They  make  the  difference  of  consciousness. 

The  above  considerations  are  not  intended  to  initiate  an  opening 
in  the  direction  of  monism.  Once  to  be  related  is  not  always  to  be 
related.  If  a  quality  in  a  complex  is  constituted  by  the  relations,  a 
complete  change  in  relations  is  followed  by  the  disappearance  of  the 
quality.  We  seem  forced  to  conclude  that  certain  qualitative  exist- 
ences are  due  to  relations,  and  when  the  relations  are  completely 
changed,  the  qualities  are  no  longer  existent.  And  furthermore,  \ 
in  opposition  to  monism,  because  a  thing  is  related  in  many  ways,  it 
does  not  follow  that  it  is  related  in  every  way.  Because  a  complex 
means  many  things  is  no  evidence  that  it  means  everything. 

6.     The  Element  of  Platonism. 

The  neo-realist  is  a  Platonic  realist.  When  we  say  that  Plato  was 
a  realist,  what  is  meant,  I  should  presume,  is  that  the  idea  which  for 
Plato  is  reality,  exists  independent  of  any  knowledge  of  it.  Plato's 
ideas  do  not  depend  on  finite  thinking  for  their  being.  They  are 
eternal,  immutable  entities. 

Idealism,  as  we  have  repeatedly  observed,  tends  toward  the  iden- 
tification of  the  knowing  process  with  the  content  known.  The 
strongest  case  for  the  idealistic  position  is  cited  in  respect  to  the  truths 
of  mathematics.  Mathematical  truths,  the  idealist  may  say,  are  made 
by  the  mathematical  mind  which  thinks  them.  Surely,  he  may  con- 
tend, a  tangent  to  a  circle  did  not  exist  before  some  one  conceived 
the  tangential  relation,  and  thus  created  it  as  a  mathematical 
entity.  It  is  in  response  to  the  demand  to  say  something  touching 
the  status  of  such  entities  as  mathematical  truths  that  the  new  realist 
returns  to  Platonism.  The  neo-realist  is  a  Platonic  realist.  "He 
accords  full  ontological  status  to  the  things  of  thought  as  well  as  to 
the  things  of  sense,  to  logical  entities,  as  well  as  to  physical  entities, 
or  to  subsistents  as  well  as  to  existents."  The  propositions  of  mathe- 

41 


matics  exist  and  are  there  eternally,  to  be  discovered  in  precisely 
the  same  sense  in  which  Columbus  discovered  America. 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  the  new  realist  is  forced  to  such  a  doctrine. 
The  separation  is  made  between  the  content  known  and  the  knowing 
of  it,  and  the  knowing  plays  no  part  in  the  constituting  of  content. 
Consciousness  is  absolutely  void  of  any  internal  mechanism  of  its 
own.  Knowing  makes  no  difference  because  it  has  no  difference  to 
make.  It  is  an  undifferentiated  process;  it  has  no  forms  to  impress, 
no  conditions  to  impose.  Consequently  "The  things  of  thought  as 
well  as  the  things  of  sense"  must  derive  their  title  to  be,  whether 
that  of  existence  or  that  of  subsistence,  form  a  source  other  than  that 
of  the  knowing  process. 

The  Platonic  element  of  new  realism  may  be  stated  from  the 
standpoint  of  universals.  That  universals  are  contents  of  some  sort 
is  a  fact  revealed  by  direct  empirical  introspection.  That  man,  cir- 
cularity, beauty  are  contents  of  some  description  cannot  be  denied. 
They  are  there  and  must  be  reckoned  with,  they  influence  human 
action,  they  give  validity  to  much  of  our  thinking,  and  in  the  case  of 
the  universals  of  mathematics,  their  formulae  may  be  written. 

Modern  psychology  has  endowed  the  mind  with  the  mechanism  of 
conception.  From  an  empirical  observation  of  a  sufficient  number 
of  particulars,  the  mind  abstracts  qualities  which  are  alike  and  thus 
fabricates  a  universal.  If  the  mind  is  ever  constitutive  of  its  content, 
it  is  certainly  in  the  case  of  the  formation  of  abstract  and  universal 
contents. 

But  it  seems  plain  that  the  mind  can  not  do  any  such  thing.  In 
the  first  place,  if  there  is  no  mechanism  of  consciousness,  consciousness 
being  the  element  of  mere  awareness,  it  has  no  such  internal  power 
of  conception.  And  in  the  second  place,  even  if  such  a  power  were 
resident  in  the  nature  of  thinking,  it  seems  impossible  to  understand 
how  such  an  operation  as  the  fabrication  of  a  universal  could  be  per- 
formed. I  am  unable  to  see  how  the  mind  could  tear  off  qualities 
from  their  context  and  re-piece  them  into  an  alien  something  which 
is  then  termed  a  universal.  Reality  does  not  so  easily  lend  itself  to 
disruption.  Even  on  Mr.  Bradley's  assumptions,  first,  that  certain 
contents  work  loose  from  reality,  and  second,  that  in  judgment  con- 
tents are  predicated  of  reality,  I  can  not  see  how  any  number  of 
floating  contents  could  ever  be  merged  into  a  universal.  And  further- 
more, if  the  universal  is  constructed  by  the  disremption  and  rewelding 
of  qualities,  it  seems  that  the  universal  would  in  the  end  turn  out 

42 


to  be  a  particular  much  like  the  ones  from  which  the  qualities  were 
originally  stripped.  On  any  theory  of  the  reduplication  of  contents, 
therefore,  it  seems  impossible  to  understand  how  the  mind  can  gen- 
erate a  universal.  The  conclusion  must  be,  consequently,  that  if  an 
inventory  of  the  contents  of  the  universe  includes  universals,  those 
universals  have  not  been  constructed.  They  are  eternal  entities,  they 
exist. 

Professor  Woodbridge,  whose  lead  I  have  largely  followed  in 
the  account  of  universals,  makes  it  very  clear  that  universals  cannot 
be  perceived.  Only  particulars  are  given  in  perception.  Universals 
exist,  though  by  their  nature  they  can  never  be  contents  of  percep- 
tion. I  perceive  circles,  but  I  never  perceive  circularity.  Circularity 
can  only  be  thought. 

The  realistic  doctrine  of  the  existence  of  universals  is  sufficient  evi- 
dence that  the  new  realism,  with  all  its  allegiance  to  science,  is  not 
materialism.  Materialism  means,  among  other  things,  that  the  whole 
of  reality  is  comprised  within  a  space — time — quality  universe  where 
all  complexes  may  conceivably  be  perceived.  Of  course  ultra-violet 
rays  cannot  be  perceived,  but  for  the  reason  that  we  have  no  mech- 
anism of  perception  whose  range  is  wide  enough.  But  in  opposition 
to  materialism,  new  realism  maintains  that  there  are  existents  whose 
nature  transcends  a  space — time — quality  system,  and  which  can  never 
become  objects  of  perception. 
7.  The  Doctrine  of  Subsistence. 

The  term  realism  is  somewhat  misleading  and  is  not  fully  descrip- 
tive of  the  meaning  which  new  realism  is  intended  to  convey.  Reality 
means  existence,  and  the  new  realist  by  no  means  asserts  the  existence 
or  reality  of  all  contents.  The  most  inclusive  of  all  categories  is  the 
category  of  subsistence.  All  contents  whatsoever  have  being;  they 
subsist;  they  are.  "We  use  the  term  'subsistent',"  says  Professor 
Montague,  "to  denominate  the  totality  of  actual  and  possible  objects 
of  thought."  Existence  or  reality  is  a  less  wide  category  and  applies 
to  some  contents  within  the  realm  of  subsistence.  All  contents  of 
which  I  am  or  may  be  aware  subsist,  but  not  all  contents  of  which 
I  am  or  may  be  aware  exist.  Now  it  is  the  essence  of  realism  to  as- 
sert that  all  contents,  whether  existents  or  subsistents,  are  what  they 
are  independent  or  whether  they  are  known.  "But  what  I  suppose," 
says  Professor  Holt,  "that  realism  insists  on  is  that  every  content, 
whether  term  or  proposition,  real  or  unreal,  subsists  of  its  own  right 
in  the  all-inclusive  universe  of  being;  it  has  being  as  any  mathematical 

43 


or  physical  term  or  proposition  has  being;  and  that  this  being  is  not 
'subjective'  in  its  nature." 

Among  the  new  realists  Professor  Montague  and  Professor  Holt 
make  use  of  the  doctrine  of  subsistence  for  the  explanation  of  illusions, 
dreams,  hallucinations,  and  error.  Realism  meets  the  problem  of 
error,  writes  Professor  Holt,  "by  borrowing  from  Logic  and  Mathe- 
matics the  well-authenticated  distinction  between  reality  and  being. 
The  universe  is  not  all  real ;  but  the  universe  all  is."  Dr.  Montague 
holds  that  "the  true  and  the  false  are  respectively  the  real  and  the 
unreal,  considered  as  possible  objects  of  belief  or  judgment."  And 
by  unreal  he  means  the  merely  subsistent.  The  real  universe,  he 
maintains  "consists  of  the  space-time  system  of  existents  together  with 
all  that  is  presupposed  by  that  system."  The  content  of  error,  dreams, 
illusions,  and  hallucinations,  when  such  content  is  directly  presented 
to  the  knower,  is  merely  subsistential,  that  is  to  say,  such  content  is 
an  object  of  thought  but  has  no  existential  status  in  a  space-time- 
quality  system.  The  ground  for  such  a  view  is  fully  cleared  by  Pro- 
fessor Montague  in  his  doctrine  of  consciousness  as  a  form  of  energy 
implicative  of  contents,  into  an  exposition  of  which  it  is  beyond  the 
present  essay  to  go.* 

It  is  the  essential  thesis  of  subjectivism  that  any  content  which 
exists  only  in  being  perceived  is  psychical.  Now  there  is  evidence  that 
such  contents  as  dreams,  illusions,  hallucinations  and  error  exist  only 
in  being  perceived,  consequently  they  are  taken  by  the  idealist  to  be 
subjective. 

One  thing  about  an  illusion  that  every  one  will  admit  is  that  as 
"perceived  content"  it  appears  and  disappears.  The  perceived  illu- 
sion, so  far  as  awareness  goes,  begins  and  ends.  What  I  perceive  in 
my  dreams  is  perceived  only  while  I  am  dreaming  it.  A  spatial  illu- 
sion, as  illusion,  endures  so  long  as  it  is  perceived.  Now  it  is  obvious 
that  in  perceiving  an  illusion  I  am  perceiving  something.  The  con- 
tent of  an  allusion  cannot,  on  the  realistic  view,  be  a  reality,  that  is, 
an  existent,  for  in  that  event,  its  existence,  it  is  thought,  would  be 
due  to  its  being  perceived.  And  furthermore,  the  realist  contends  that 
the  perceived  object  is  numerically  identical  with  the  real  object,  and 
it  is  quite  certain  that  the  perceived  content  of  an  illusion  is  not 
numerically  identical  writh  the  real  object  for  which  it  is  taken  to 
be,  for  in  that  case  it  would  not  be  an  illusion.  It  is  plain  that,  on 


*cf.     Dr.  Montague's  Essay  in   The  New  Realism,  "A  Realistic  Theory 
of  Truth  and  Error." 


the  realistic  view,  the  content  of  an  illusion  cannot  be  non-being, 
for  the  neo-realist  has  no  such  category.  There  is  a  category  of  non- 
existence.  Non-existence  is  the  unreal,  and  by  that  is  meant  the 
merely  subsistent.  Nor  can  the  content  of  the  illusion  be  subjective, 
for  it  is  against  subjectivism  that  new  realism  is  primarily  a  polemic. 
The  conclusion  is,  therefore,  that  the  content  of  an  illusion  is  neither 
an  existent,  nor  non-being,  nor  subjective  content.  It  is  a  subsistent. 

Prof.  Montague  and  Prof.  Holt,  consequently,  modify  the  ideal- 
istic thesis  which  asserts  that  anything  which  exists  only  in  being 
perceived  is  psychical.  They  maintain  that  contents  so  designated 
are  subsistents.  Contents  which  appear  only  in  being  perceived  are 
subsistential.  An  illusion  is  a  perceived  subsistent,  and  the  subsis- 
tent known  is  independent  of  its  being  known.  We  call  it  an  illusion 
because  when  its  being  is  a  content  of  awareness,  it  resembles  a 
physical  existent  which  we  often  take  it  to  be. 

What  seems  plain  from  the  foregoing  account  is  that  there  are  cer- 
tain contents  which  appear  only  while  they  are  being  perceived.  From 
this  the  idealist  concludes  that  such  contents  are  psychical.  The 
realist  concludes  that  they  are  merely  subsistent.  It  seems  more  than 
a  coincidence  that  the  class  of  contents  which  has  led  the  idealist  to 
a  doctrine  of  subjectivism  has  forced  the  new  realist  into  the  position 
of  mere  subsistence. 
8.  The  Physiological  Issue. 

It  has  been  repeatedly  stated  that  there  is  no  mechanism  of  con- 
sciousness. But  there  is  a  mechanism  of  perception.  What  is  needed 
is  scientific  inquiry  into  the  conditions  of  perception.  Perception,  at 
least  under  normal  conditions,  takes  place  through  the  mechanism 
of  the  nervous  system.  And  the  mechanism,  it  seems  obvious,  may  be 
interferred  with.  The  entire  issue  of  realism  may  be  stated  from 
the  physiological  point  of  view.  Does  the  fact  that  objects  are  per- 
ceived through  the  medium  of  a  nervous  system  at  all  modify  the 
objects  perceived?  Is  the  function  of  the  nervous  system  merely  to 
receive,  transmit,  or  inhibit  stimuli,  or  does  it  exercise  the  additional 
function  of  reacting  to  the  stimuli  in  such  a  way  as  to  change  or  trans- 
form them?  Do  the  qualities  of  the  object  perceived  as  being  what 
they  are  taken  to  be  in  any  sense  depend  upon  their  relation  to  a 
nervous  system?  Let  us  suppose  a  universe  without  a  single  nervous 
system,  just  precisely  what  difference  would  be  made  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  universe  by  the  sudden  supervention  of  a  number  of  human 
nervous  systems?  There  would  be  the  difference  due  to  the  produc- 

45 


there  be  any  further  difference  save  that  of  awareness? 

The  physiological  issue  is  fully  discussed  in  an  admirable  essay* 
by  Professor  Holt  in  The  New  Realism.  Such  topics  as  optical  illu- 
sions, spatial  displacement,  the  time  lapse  in  perception,  positive,  nega- 
tive, and  complementary  after-images  are  adequately  explained  by 
physics  and  physiology,  and  that  without  any  recourse  to  subjectivism, 
or  any  abandonment  of  the  claims  of  realism. 

Most  noteworthy  is  the  doctrine  of  nerve  conduction  which  is 
formulated  by  Professor  Holt.  The  argument  accounting  for  the 
qualitative  differences  of  the  secondary  qualities  based  upon  the  doc- 
trine of  the  specific  energy  of  nerves  is  thoroughly  reviewed  and  re- 
jected. No  ultimate  and  unresolvable  differences  among  nerve  im- 
pulses, nerve  fibrils,  cortical  cells,  or  synapses,  have  been  discovered 
by  nerve  physiology.  The  doctrine  advanced  by  Professor  Holt, 
formulated  from  the  recent  investigations  of  Rutherford,  Meyer, 
More,  Meislung,  and  others,  is  that  the  quality  of  sensations  is  trans- 
mited  to  the  brain  by  vibratory  nerve  impulses,  and  that  the  vibration 
rate  corresponds  to  the  rate  of  the  stimulus.  In  the  case  of  sound,  the 
nervous  impulse  presents  "periodic  vibrations  identical  in  rate  with 
the  vibrations  of  the  outer  sound  stimulus."  And  in  the  case  of 
vision,  it  is  asserted  that  the  visual  impulse  in  its  course  along  the 
optic  nerve  is  "a  vibratory  impulse  whose  period  corresponds  with 
the  vibration  rate  of  the  impinging  stimulus."  This  theory  is  based 
upon  the  investigations  of  Meislung  who  has  "adduced  facts  and 
arguments  of  great  weight  to  show  that  the  visual  cones  are  electro- 
magnetic resonators,  and  that  the  optic  nerve  must  carry  impulses  of 
a  frequency  proportional  to  that  of  waves  of  light."  The  theory  of 
nerve  conduction  set  forth  by  Professor  Holt  is  an  admirable  example 
of  the  method  of  new  realism,  a  method  recognizing  and  according 
value  to  the  results  of  science.  New  realism  is,  in  this  respect,  in 
marked  contrast  to  the  speculations  of  idealism  and  its  claim  of  au- 
thority respecting  scientific  investigation. 

According  to  this  view  the  knowerf  is  in  continuous,  sympathetic 
contact  with  the  object  known.  The  intervening  vibrations  are  not 
the  object.  The  red  does  not  fill  all  the  space  between  the  rose  and 
the  eye.  Into  Profssor  Holt's  doctrine  of  secondary  qualities  it  is 
unnecessary  for  our  present  purpose  to  go.  There  are  independent 

*uThe  Place  of  Illusory  Experience  in  a  Realistic  World." 
fRealism   repeatedly   uses   the   term   knower,    though    it   offers   no   meta- 
physical  theory   as  to   its   nature,     cf  W.   P.   Montague,   "May   a   Realist  be 
a  Pragmatist?"  Journal  of  Phil,  Psy.,  and  Scientific  Method,  Vol.  VI,  1909. 

46 


reals,  existents  with  which  the  knower  is  in  homogeneous  contact. 
And  the  function  of  the  mechanism  of  perception  is  to  put  the  knower 
into  sympathetic  relations  with  the  objects  to  be  known. 

Now  the  problem  arises  as  to  the  explanation  of  the  nature  and 
origin  of  that  class  of  contents  which  are  centrally  induced.  Dreams 
and  hallucinations  involve  no  peripheral  stimulations.  "How  then," 
it  is  asked,  "can  realism  pretend  to  assert  the  reality  of  the  color, 
sound,  and  perhaps  tactile  or  olfactory  sensations  which  are  avowedly 
present  in  the  dreams  of  a  person  sleeping,  it  may  be,  in  a  box  no  bigger 
than  his  coffin?  The  case  has  still  two  aspects:  first,  how  can 
these  purely  hallucinatory  secondary  qualities  have,  even  in  them- 
selves alone,  any  sort  of  being  other  than  a  subjective  and  mental 
being?  Second,  *  *  *  how  can  they  pretend  to  assert  themselves  to 
be,  or  how  can  the  realist  pretend  to  assert  them  to  be  the  real  ob- 
ject?" 

Now  dreams  and  hallucinations  are,  according  to  Professor  Holt, 
subsistents.  And  when  such  contents  become  known,  what  happens, 
so  far  as  I  understand  the  implications  of  Professor  Holt's  treatment, 
is  that  cognitive  relations  are  set  up  between  them  and  their  knower 
without  the  intervention  of  the  usual  mechanism  or  perception. 
Touching  this  view  I  shall  only  remark  that,  to  say  that  the  world  of 
subsistents  contains  contents  with  which  I  may  negotiate  relations  in 
a  manner  different  from  ordinary  perception  seems  to  me  to  be  mystic- 
ism, a  doctrine  which  the  new  realist  expressly  repudiates. 

V.     A  REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  OBJECTIVE 

Along  with  the  foregoing  account,  largely  sympathetic,  of  the 
new  realistic  movement  viewed  in  its  reaction  to  idealism,  I  have 
offered  already,  with  extreme  diffidence  I  confess,  random  comments. 
It  seems  a  part  of  my  task,  however,  to  add  further  a  sketch  of  such 
a  realistic  doctrine  as  I  myself  feel  inclined  to  accept. 

The  most  interesting  of  all  problems  is  the  problem  as  to  the  na- 
ture of  consciousness.  Whatever  consciousness  may  be,  it  seems  to 
me  that  it  is  something  which  is  generated,  it  is  subsequent  to  and 
dependent  on  the  generating  environment.  Nature  develops  to  the 
point  where  consciousness  appears,  and  consciousness  performs  for  na- 
ture the  function  of  knowing.  Matter  gets  itself  kown,  and  this 
tion  of  such  contents  as  owe  their  existence  to  the  organism-environ- 
ment interaction  such  as  tertiary  qualities,  for  example.  But  would 

47 


knowing  is  in  the  interest  of  human  activity.  Consciousness  is  not 
only  a  product,  but  it  is  developed  in  a  situation  in  which  some 
relatons  are  internal.  For  I  cannot  conceive  of  anything  as  remark- 
able as  consciousness  coming  into  being  within  a  universe  where  all 
entities  are  immutable  and  where  all  relations  are  external.  Either 
consciousness  must  be  one  of  the  entities  and  itself  eternal,  or  else 
some  relations  are  constitutive.  This  does  not  mean  that  conscious- 
ness is  itself  an  internal  relation.  Among  the  qualities  which  enter 
into  a  physical  complex,  many  of  them,  both  as  to  their  presence 
there  and  as  to  the  specific  tone  which  they  exemplify,  are  what  they 
are  on  account  of  the  relations  in  which  they  stand,  but  among  these 
relations  consciousness  is  never  one.  The  distinction  must  be  kept 
in  mind  between  physical  relations  being  constitutive  of  qualitative 
differences,  between  my  body  and  its  interactions  with  the  environ- 
ment being  constitutive  of  contents,  and  consciousness  being  constitu- 
tive of  contents.  Now  it  seems  plain  that  both  physical  relations, 
and  the  organism-environment  interaction  are  productive  of  contents, 
but  this  does  not  mean  that  consciousness  has  had  anything  whatever 
to  do  with  such  productions. 

Let  us  begin  with  two  theoretical  categories,  the  Objective  and  the 
Subjective.  Contents  are  true  parts  of  the  Objective  when  their 
existence  is  independent  of  their  being  known.  Contents  are  true 
parts  of  the  Subjective,  let  us  say,  when  their  existence  is  constituted 
by  their  being  known. 

Now  this  distinction  between  the  Objective  and  the  Subjective 
does  not  imply  any  ontological  dualism.  There  is  only  one  order  of 
being,  the  order  of  nature,  and  all  the  contents  of  which  one  is  con- 
scious as  well  as  the  act  of  being  conscious  of  them  belong  to  this 
order.  Reality  and  nature  are  synonomous.  All  contents  are  natural 
existents,  and  any  distinctions  that  have  to  be  made  are  distinctions 
within  the  natural  order.  By  Subjective,  therefore,  it  is  not  meant 
to  suggest  any  realm  of  existence  discontinuous  with  or  qualitatively 
unlike  the  order  of  the  Objective.  The  very  fact  that  consciousness 
is  something  which  is  generated  in  a  natural  environment  is  evidence 
of  the  fact  that  its  existence  is  homogeneous  with  the  natural  order. 
When,  therefore,  the  process  termed  consciousness  or  awareness  is 
called  psychical,  it  is  not  intended  to  suggest  any  process  belonging 
to  an  order  of  reality  wholly  disparate  from  the  contents  which  gen- 
erate it.  All  that  psychical  means  is  a  process  or  act  of  becoming 
aware  of.  And  the  awareness  belongs  as  much  to  the  natural  order 

48 


as  any  content  to  be  found  there.  It  is  one  thing  to  have  a  natural 
and  a  supra-natural  order,  supra-natural  being  used  in  the  sense  in 
which  T.  H.  Green  employs  the  term;  it  is  another  thing  to  make 
distinctions  within  the  natural  order.  Both  the  Objective  and  the 
Subjective  belong  to  the  order  of  nature,  and  the  psychical  act  of 
being  conscious  also  belongs  to  that  order. 

We  have  held  that  some  relations  are  constitutive  of  contents.  And 
we  have  held  that  consciousness  is  something  which  is  generated.  Now 
might  not  consciousness,  when  generated,  become  itself  an  efficient 
factor  in  a  further  relational  context  and  so  become  productive  of 
other  contents?  In  the  situation  in  which  consciousness  is  first  gen- 
erated it  is  an  external  relation,  but  in  the  second  situation  in  which 
it  figures  as  a  term  it  is  constitutive  of  content  in  a  manner  similar 
to  the  terms  which  were  originally  constitutive  of  it.  If  there  are 
such  contents,  then  let  us  employ  the  term  Subjective  to  describe 
them.  And  I  want  to  make  it  plain  that  by  Subjective  I  do  not  mean 
subjective  in  the  sense  in  which  idealism  uses  the  term,  that  is  as 
mental  entities  existing  within  a  mind  like  Locke's  ideas. 

The  problem  before  us  is  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  subjective 
must  be  retained  as  a  category;  whether,  that  is,  all  contents  belong 
to   the   Objective. 
1.     The  Objective. 

The  test  of  the  Objective  is  independence  of  being  known.  Mr. 
Nunn,  as  we  have  seen,  also  adds  the  test  of  priority.  But  this  view 
does  not  seem  to  me  to  be  tenable.  Most  contents  do  exist  prior  to 
their  being  known,  but  very  often  the  conditions  which  generate 
contents  are  contemporaneous  with  the  conditions  which  generate  an 
awareness  of  them.  This  seems  to  be  true  in  the  case  of  optical  dis- 
tortions due  to  pressing  on  the  eye-balls. 

So  far  as  the  Objective  is  concerned,  we  have  a  thoroughgoing 
realism.  I  shall  now  seek  to  give  an  inventory  and  brief  description 
of  the  contents  belonging  to  the  Objective,  including  only  those  which 
seem  to  me  undeniably  to  belong  to  that  order.  Those  contents  are 
true  parts  of  the  Objective  which  are  indicated  by  the  terms  sensing, 
affection,  tertiary  qualities,  memory,  universals  and  perception.  These 
contents  may  be  briefly  discussed  in  the  order  indicated.  It  is  in 
connection  with  a  realistic  account  of  perception  that  my  chief  interest 
lies,  and  the  brief  discussion  of  the  contents  of  the  Objective  given  in 
the  other  processes  indicated  is  intended  to  clear  the  way  for  a  doctrine 
of  perception.  To  postpone  the  discussion  of  perception  is  somewhat 

49 


awkward,  but  I  can  only  state  my  view  after  a  discussion  of  more  ele- 
mentary processes. 

a.  It  is  evident  that  my  body  is  at  all  times  receiving  stimulations 
from  the  environment  with  which  it  is  in  homogeneous  contact.    And 
these  stimulations  are  continually  eliciting  responses  from  my  body. 
Whenever  my  body  directly  encounters   its  environment  or  where 
one  part  of  my  body  is  directly  encountering  another  part,  I  mean 
for  such  behavior  to  be  described  by  the  term  sensing.     Both  the 
act  of  sensing  and  the  content  sensed  are  purely  physical.     Sensing  is 
completely  void  of  any  element  of  awareness.     In  the  responses  of  an 
amoeba  and  the  automatic  and  reflex  adaptations  of  a  human  being 
there  is  no  qualitative  distinction.     Of  course  among  human  beings 
sensing  may  be  done  alone  with  consciousness,  but  the  consciousness 
is  not  part  of  the  sensing.    All  sensing  is  primarily  in  the  interest  of 
human  action. 

b.  The  Objective  contains  not  only  the  contents  designated  by  the 
physical  objects  given  in  perception*  and  sensing,  it  also  includes  the 
affective  states  within  my  body.     My  feelings,  by  which  I  mean    my 
pains  and  pleasures  and  emotions  are  existentially  present  when  they 
are  felt.     My  contention  is  that  the  realistic  doctrine  applies  to  the 
contents  of  feeling  equally  as  well  as  to  contents  denoted  as  physical 
objects  outside  of  my  body. 

The  idealist  points  to  pains  as  existing  only  when  they  are  felt. 
Surely  it  is  said,  my  head-ache  exists  only  when  I  am  conscious  of  it. 
Remove  the  consciousness  of  it,  and  the  pain  is  with  the  same  stroke, 
annihilated.  Therefore,  the  existence  of  the  pain,  it  is  concluded,  is 
physical.  This  is,  I  take  it,  on  its  philosophical  side  and  independent 
of  religious  implications,  the  position  of  Christian  Science.  And  if 
the  existence  of  pains  and  illusions  is  due  to  their  being  perceived,  then 
that  position  is  unassailable.  Cease  to  be  aware  of  the  pain  and 
the  pain  forthwith  disappears.  But  the  connection  holding  between 
pains  and  the  awareness  of  them  is  precisely  like  the  connection  hold- 
ing between  physical  objects  and  the  awareness  of  them.  The  fallacy 
of  Christian  Science,  it  seems  to  me,  is  the  failure  to  distinguish  the 
content  felt  from  the  feeling  of  it.  The  act  of  feeling  is  psychical, 
and  like  any  other  act  of  being  aware  of.  The  content  felt  is  phys- 
ical and  independent  of  its  being  felt. 

And  some  realists,  too,  as  Professor  Montague,  for  example,  hold 
that  feelings  do  not  exist  apart  from  their  being  felt.  Professor  Mon- 


*Assuming  for  the  present  a   realistic  doctrine  of  perception. 

50 


tague  would  still  hold  that  pains  are  natural  events,  thus  distinguish- 
ing his  position  from  idealism,  only  that  consciousness,  which  is  also  a 
natural  event,  is  constitutive  of  feelings.  Feelings  are  for  Professor 
Montague  what  I  have  above  described  as  constituting  the  contents 
of  the  Subjective. 

Both  views,  it  seems  to  me,  are  wrong.  Feelings  are  not  psychical 
existents  in  the  idealistic  meaning  of  the  term,  nor  are  they  contents 
of  the  Subjective,  in  the  sense  in  which  I  use  that  term.  They  are 
true  contents  of  the  Objective.  A  pain  is  as  much  a  natural  event 
as  any  happening  in  the  physical  universe,  only  my  pains  are  always 
localized  in  my  body.  A  fever  is  as  much  a  physical  event  as  a 
thunder-storm.  It  may  be  that  the  conditions  which  generate  pain 
contents  are  usually  those  which  generate  awareness  of  them.  Pain 
is  the  result  of  generating  physical  conditions  which  are  so  violent 
that  one  is  forced  to  take  cognizance  of  them.  But  this  is  not  always 
true,  for  sometimes  pains  are  not  felt.  This  does  not  mean  that  they 
do  not  then  exist;  they  are  there,  though  awareness  is  inhibited,  pre- 
cisely as  an  object  of  perception  is  there  though  attention  is  not 
directed  to  it.  The  feelings  of  the  fever  are  as  independent  of  the 
awareness  of  them  as  are  the  rain-drops  in  the  thunder-storm.  If 
the  fever  runs  sufficiently  high,  one  becomes  wwconscious,  awareness 
may  entirely  disappear,  but  surely  the  fever  is  still  there. 

Pains  are  physical  facts.  Ordinarily  they  do  not  exist  except  along 
with  awareness  because  the  conditions  which  give  rise  to  them  are 
also  coincident  with  the  conditions  which  produce  the  consciousness 
of  them.  And  I  can  see  no  reason  for  withholding  from  pains  the  real- 
istic thesis  of  independence.  The  pain  which  I  now  feel  is  real  inde- 
pendent of  its  being  felt,  and  it  may  (but  usualy  does  not)  continue 
to  exist  when  I  no  longer  feel  it. 

One  may  feel  inclined  to  object  to  this  view  on  the  ground  that 
two  people  may  perceive  the  same  external  object,  but  no  two  people 
can  perceive  the  same  pain.  Pains  are  peculiarly  mine  in  a  way  in 
which  no  other  contents  are.  If  pains  are  physical  events  like  thun- 
der-storms they  should  be  isolated  and  identified  as  such.  The  argu- 
ment does  show  that  nobody  else  can  feel  my  pain,  but  it  does  not  show 
that  the  pain  is  psychical  or  subjective.  All  that  the  argument  can 
possibly  mean,  as  Professor  Woodbridge  has  pointed  out,  is  that  we  do 
not  have  any  affective  mechanism  for  perceiving  other  peoples'  pains. 

I  wish  here  to  revert  to  the  theory  of  physical  realism  as  set  forth 
by  Thomas  Case.  His  thesis  was,  it  is  recalled,  that  sense  data  were 

51 


localized  in  the  body,  that  they  were  the  nervous  system  sensibly 
affected.  Realism  has  since  removed  these  sense  data  and  placed 
them  in  external  nature  where  they  really  belong.  Now  what  Case 
did  for  sense  data,  it  seems  to  me,  can  be  done  for  feelings.  The 
feelings  are  the  nervous  system  sensibly  affected.  Just  as  the  object 
of  perception  is  out  there  in  space  where  common  sense  supposes  it  to 
be,  so  the  content  of  feeling  is  there  in  my  body  where  it  is  felt  to  be. 

This  realistic  doctrine  of  feelings  is  intended  to  include  emotions. 
The  content  of  an  emotion  is  as  much  physical  and  as  independent 
of  any  consciousness  of  it  as  the  content  of  boiling  water.  The  con- 
tent of  emotions  is  always  localized  somewhere  in  my  body ;  the  bodily 
reactions  are  the  contents  of  the  emotions.  The  James-Lange  Theory 
is  to  the  effect  that  the  bodily  changes  precede  the  emotions,  and  that 
the  emotion  is  the  "feeling"  of  the  bodily  reactions.  If 
by  "feeling"  Professor  James  means  no  more  than  mere  awareness, 
I  have  nothing  to  add  to  his  view.  The  content  of  physiological 
changes  going  on  within  a  nervous  organism  is  different  from  the  con- 
tent of  internal  changes  going  on  in  complexes  which  have  no  nervous 
system,  and  feeling  and  emotion  is,  among  other  things  perhaps,  that 
which  makes  the  difference. 

The  content  of  perceived  physical  objects  is  outside  of  my  body. 
The  content  of  feeling  is  inside  my  body.  In  the  case  of  so-called 
tertiary  qualities,  as  the  gloominess  of  the  day,  the  fearfulness  of 
the  danger,  the  qualities  are  given  in  an  environment-organism  inter- 
action. They  are  constituted  by  this  interaction,  but  it  is  an  inter- 
action in  which  consciousness  has  nothing  to  do.  Tertiary  qualities 
are  true  parts  of  the  Objective. 

c.  Memory.  It  is  one  of  the  leading  tasks  of  philosophy,  I  sup- 
pose, to  recognize  genuine  problems.  The  problem  in  connection 
with  memory  is  to  state  how  a  content  which  once  existed  but  no 
longer  does,  or  which  was  once  perceived,  but  no  longer  is,  continues 
to  be  thought  of  under  subsequent  conditions.  Subjectivism  has  an 
easy  way  out.  It  offers  as  a  solution  that  the  mind  re-creates  its 
contents  by  thinking  them.  According  to  Hume,  the  mind  takes  a 
copy  of  its  sense-impressions  and  these  copies,  purely  subjective  men- 
tal creations,  are  perpetuated  as  ideas,  or  at  least  re-created  when 
the  occasion  demands.  I  use  the  term  subjectivism  in  the  wide  sense 
in  which  the  new  realist  employs  the  term,  to  stand  for  any  type  of 
idealism  which  maintains  that  the  subject — object  relation  is  a  cog- 
nitive relation,  a  relation  which  presupposes  consciousness  as  a 

52 


sine  qua  non  of  existence.  Whenever  you  find  an  object,  that  object, 
the  subjective  contents,  is  found  as  known.  This  does  not  mean  that 
contents  are  necessarily  intra-mental  like,  for  example,  Locke's  ideas; 
it  merely  means  that  they  cannot  exist  apart  from  the  psychical  act 
which  knows  them.  But  new  realism,  with  its  concept  of  inde- 
pendence as  its  essential  thesis,  is  opposed  to  subjectivism.  The  sub- 
ject-object relation  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  thesis  of  independ- 
ence in  such  a  manner  as  to  account  for  the  realistic  presentation  of 
memory  contents.  Such  contents  are  not  only  not  intra-mental, 
but  their  being  is  independent  of  their  being  known. 

Let  us  say  that  I  call  to  memory  yesterday's  sunset.  That  sunset 
does  not  exist  to-day,  but  I  continue  to  think  of  it  after  it  ceases  to 
be.  Now  in  thinking  about  the  sunset  which  no  longer  is,  just  what 
am  I  thinking  about?  Thinking  I  have  said  is  always  about  some- 
thing. What,  therefore,  is  the  status  of  the  content  now  before  my 
mind?  If  any  contents  are  actually  present  to  my  mind,  it  seems 
clear  that  they  are  contents  of  the  Subjective.  But  I  do  not  believe 
that  memory  contents  belong  to  the  Subjective.  In  thinking  about 
yesterday's  sunset  I  am  thinking  about  the  sunset  which  was.  So  far 
as  remembering  can  be  said  to  have  content,  it  is  the  actual  content 
which  did  constitute  the  real  sunset.  In  order  to  remember  something 
which  once  occurred  does  not  mean  that  I  re-create  any  present  con- 
tent, nor  does  it'mean  that  the  content  has  all  the  while  been  tucked 
away  somewhere  as  a  sort  of  psychical  hang-over.  An  awareness  of 
content  is  generated  in  the  absence  of  the  content  of  which  I  am 
aware.  How  I  can  think  of  an  object  which  was  once  perceived  but 
no  longer  is,  or  which  once  existed  but  no  longer  does,  I  am  sure  I 
do  not  know.  But  consciousness  is  the  kind  of  a  function  which  can 
perform  just  that  sort  of  an  act. 

d.  In  connection  with  the  topic  of  universals  it  seems  unnecessary 
to  say  more  than  that   I   accept  the  realistic  view  that   universals 
exist,  that  they  may  be  thought,  but  that  they  can  never  be  perceived. 

e.  Perception.     The  amoeba  merely  senses.     The  content  sensed 
is  never  interpreted.     Human  beings  interpret  the  contents  they  sense, 
or  may  do  so.     The  act  of  sensing  with  interpretation  I  call  percep- 
tion.    All  perception  is  a  case  of  being  aware  of,  and  all  awareness 
involves  at  least  a  minimum  of  reflection. 

Some  confusion  in  contemporary  philosophy  has  arisen  over  the 
question  as  to  whether  perception  is  a  case  of  being  conscious ;  whether, 
that  is,  perception  is  rightly  termed  a  cognitive  function.  Surely 

53 


we  may  all  agree  that  the  content  perceived  is  not  cognitive.  It 
does  not  know  anything.  Only  the  act  of  knowing  is  cognitive.  A 
further  misunderstanding  arises  in  connection  with  how  much  the 
term  perception  is  intended  to  include.  Many  contents,  both  bodily 
and  extra-bodily  may  be  sensed  and  reacted  to  without  any  presence 
of  consciousness  whatsoever.  And  those  actions  are  not  cognitive. 
And  if  the  term  perception  is  extended  to  include  those  actions,  then 
that  much  of  perception  is  not  cognitive.  But  then  certain  contents, 
both  bodily  and  extra-bodily,  are  sensed  and  reacted  to  with  the 
presence  of  awareness.  And  these  actions  are  cognitive.  If  the  term 
perception  be  confined  to  those  actions  which  to  sense  is  to  be  aware 
of  or  to  apprehend,  apprehend  meaning  to  become  conscious  of,  then 
perception  is  cognitive.  To  say  that  I  perceive  an  object  is  to  say 
that  I  become  aware  of  it. 

If  we  use  the  term  "sense-contents"  to  cover  all  contents  usually 
said  to  be  given  through  the  senses,  then  it  is  obvious  that  much  of 
this  type  of  content  is  encountered  without  any  presence  of  conscious- 
ness. Furthermore,  it  seems  plain  that  all  sense-contents  are  natural 
events.  Now  to  some  sense-contents  awareness  is  attached,  and  then 
I  say  I  perceive  them.  And  as  to  the  origin  of  awareness,  it  may  be 
said  that  it  appears  at  the  moment  when  mere  sensing  is  inadequate, 
when  some  other  fact  is  required.  Awareness  appears  as  a  reflective 
instrument  in  behalf  of  the  successful  issue  of  the  situation. 

The  distinction  is  often  made  between  consciousness  and  self-con- 
scionsness.  The  dog  barking  at  the  moon  is  sensing  the  moon, 
but  it  is  unlikely  that  he  knows  that  he  is  sensing  the  moon.  Now  I 
do  not  believe  that  mere  sensing  ever  contains  awareness.  When 
awareness  enters,  it  means  that  more  than  just  sensing  is  going  on. 
The  distinction  between  consciousness  and  self-consciousness  is,  I  am 
inclined  to  think,  a  meaningless  distinction.  All  consciousness  is  self- 
consciousness.  Just  stareing  with  no  adjustment,  with  no  comparisons, 
with  no  reflection,  contains  no  awareness  at  all.  To  be  conscious 
means  to  know  what  you  are  about. 

The  word  perception,  I  may  add,  usually  has  associated  with  it  two 
meanings.  It  stands  for  the  content  perceived  and  the  operation 
involved.  A  difficulty  at  once  arises  as  to  the  nature  of  the  opera- 
tion. All  perception  is  sensing,  though  not  all  sensing  is  perception. 
Now  in  sensing  both  the  content  sensed  and  the  act  of  sensing  are 
physical.  Perception  is  all  this  plus  awareness.  It  is  evident,  there- 
fore, that  we  must  in  the  case  of  perception  distinguish  not  only  the 

•54 


content  perceived,  but  also  the  physical  process  of  perception  and  the 
psychical  act  of  being  aware.  I  shall  use  the  term  perceptive  process 
exclusively  in  the  sense  of  the  physical  process,  to  stand  for  the  mech- 
anism involved  when  a  perceived  object  is  given.  There  is  a  mech- 
anism of  the  physical  operation  involved  in  perceiving,  but  there  is  no 
mechanism  of  the  psychical  act  of  being  aware  of  what  is  given  in 
perception.  Idealism,  it  seems  to  me,  has  not  only  confused  the 
content  perceived  with  the  act  of  perceiving,  it  has  also  confused  the 
physical  operation  of  perceiving  with  the  psychical  act  of  perceiving. 

All  psychical  acts  involve  a  physical  operation.  Those  involving 
the  higher  cortical  centres  evade  empirical  investigation.  The  phys- 
ical mechanism  of  imagination  evades  description.  The  physical 
mechanism  of  sensing  and  perceiving  is  at  all  stages  amenable  to  phys- 
ical description.  The  physical  process  of  perception  embraces  a  con- 
tinuous and  unbroken  chain  of  casual  activity  starting  with  a  real 
object,  a  true  content  of  the  Objective,  stretching  across  an  intervening 
medium,  entering  a  human  body  and  making  there  a  sensory-motor 
circuit  and  terminating  in  certain  reactions  in  some  way  connected 
with  the  original  real  object.  Just  where  the  process  ends,  I  do  not 
feel  disposed  to  say.  The  motor  reaction  is  certainly  continuous  with 
the  preceding  part  of  the  process,  but  whether  it  should  be  taken  as  a 
part  of  perception,  I  leave  an  open  question.  The  perceptive  process 
must  be  taken  as  a  whole  and  as  such  it  occupies  time.  No  process 
can  be  so  shortened  that  it  does  not  consume  some  time,  and  none  is 
so  long  that  there  can  be  any  causal  break  in  the  line  of  its  transit. 

Furthermore,  any  interference  with  the  perceptive  process  is  a 
physical  interference,  is  open  to  empirical  investigation,  and  may, 
conceivably  at  least,  be  described  in  terms  of  physical  and  mechanical 
laws.  Influences  in  their  passage  from  real  objects  to  bodies  or  in 
their  circuit  inside  of  bodies  may  be  disturbed  or  badly  transmitted 
or  blocked,  but  such  mishappenings  are  always  open  to  physical 
computation. 

That  the  extra-bodily  portion  of  the  process  is  physical,  I  suppose 
no  one  would  deny.  But  objection  may  be  taken  regarding  that  por- 
tion of  the  process  in  which  the  nervous  system  is  involved  as  physical. 
Physiological  arguments  have  often  been  put  forward  in  behalf  of 
idealism.  I  shall  not  discuss  the  physiological  issue,  but  state  dog- 
matically my  belief  that  the  neural  portion  of  the  perceptive  process 
is  open  to  mechanical  formulation.  I  may  cite  in  passing  the  dis- 
cussion of  this  topic  in  Woodworth  and  Ladd's  Elements  of  Physio- 

55 


logical  Psychology,  Chapter  XI,  on  "The  Mechanical  Theory  of  the 
Nervous  System,"  and  also  the  view  of  nerve  conduction  as  periodic 
vibrations  given  by  Professor  Holt  in  his  essay  in  The  New  Realism, 
a  brief  account  of  which  has  already  been  given. 

In  passing  it  may  be  interesting  to  mention  the  view  of  Bergson 
that  perception  is  practical  and  not  theoretical,  that  it  is  designed 
primarily  in  the  interest  of  action  and  not  for  the  genesis  of  knowl- 
edge, that  its  function  is  essentially  biological  and  has  to  do  with 
reactions  and  adaptations  for  the  welfare  of  the  body.  It  is  a 
significant  fact  that  knowledge  arises  out  of  the  perception  process, 
is  generated  in  its  interest.  But  that  is  not  the  primal  fact.  Knowl- 
edge comes  because  action  lingers. 

As  a  result  of  the  perceptive  process,  contents  are  given.  A  further 
observation  is  that  any  perceived  content  is  a  real  content,  is  a  true 
part  of  the  Objective  and  exists  independent  of  the  psychical  act  of 
perceiving. 

It  is  here  that  the  arguments  against  realism  begin  to  appear. 
First,  it  is  asserted  that  the  qualitative  differences  in  the  same  object 
at  different  times  or  in  the  same  object  when  seen  by  different  people 
at  the  same  time  are  so  numerous  that  the  content  directly  presented 
in  prception  is  not  the  real  object  at  all.  This  difficulty,  it  is  to  be 
hoped,  has  already  been  disposed  of  in  our  earlier  contention  that 
physical  relations  and  the  organism-environment  interaction  are  con- 
stitutive of  qualitative  differences. 

Further  argument  against  the  realistic  thesis  that  what  is  imme- 
diately present  to  my  mind  in  perception  is  the  extra-mental  real  ob- 
ject is  afforded  by  considerations  arising  in  connection  with  the  "time 
lapse."  Between  the  start  of  the  ether  wave  from  an  outside  radiat- 
ing centre  and  the  occurrence  of  the  brain  event,  there  is  a  lapse  of 
time.  In  certain  cases,  so  marked  is  the  consideration  of  the  time 
element  that  the  radiating  centre  may  in  the  mean  time  have  disap- 
peared. Of  this  we  have  empirical  evidence  in  the  case  of  a  defunct 
star.  Consquently  the  perceived  object  is  said  to  be  localized  in  the 
brain  and  the  brain  is  then  endowed  with  the  function  of  fabricating 
psychical  "representations."  We  have  what  Bergson  calls  a  "trans- 
formation scene  from  fairy  land,"  as  the  stimulations  come  in  "laden 
with  the  spoils  of  matter." 

The  fallacy  here  seems  to  me  to  consist  in  isolating  a  single  episode 
in  the  perception  process  and  setting  that  up  as  the  perceived  object.  If 
the  perceived  object  is  identified  with  the  brain  event  and  localized 

56 


there,  obviously  the  time  element  gives  rise  to  confusion,  and  furnishes 
evidence  in  behalf  of  subjective  idealism.  And  the  numerical  differ- 
ence and  qualitative  distinctness  between  real  object  and  perceived 
object  would  logically  follow.  But  I  do  not  see  any  adequate  reason 
for  identifying  the  perceived  object  with  any  one  part  of  the  percep- 
tive process.  And  yet  perceived  objects  not  only  are,  but  are  also 
known.  The  function  of  "awareness"  must  somewhere  enter,  and  it 
does  seem  plausible  to  correlate  the  awareness  with  the  brain 
event. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  psychical  act  of  perceiving,  the  act  of  being 
aware  of  the  content  perceived.  We  have  said  that  all  awareness 
involves  some  reflection,  that  all  perception  is  interpretation.  Now 
does  the  content  of  which  I  am  aware  contain  any  elements  not  given 
in  the  perceptive  process?  I  say  that  I  see  the  ice  cold.  What  I  per- 
ceive is  cold  ice.  The  content  sensed  fails  to  give  all  of  which  I  am 
aware  of  when  I  say  that  I  perceived  the  ice  cold. 

Now  from  this  evident  analysis,  a  conclusion  has  been  drawn.  It 
has  been  concluded  that  the  content  of  perception  is  a  "construct" 
and  not  a  real  object  at  all.  The  type  of  idealism  which  maintains 
this  view,  I  shall,  for  purposes  of  exposition,  term  phenomenalism. 

We  may  now  contrast  the  statement  that  any  perceived  object  is  a 
real  object  with  the  position  of  phenomenalism.  Phenomenalism  is 
set  in  terms  of  the  subject-object  relation.  Its  essential  thesis  is, 
no  subject  without  object,  and  no  object  without  subject.  This 
mind-object  relation  involves  two  separate  problems,  and  the  failure 
to  recognize  their  separateness  has  given  rise  to  tremendous  confusion. 
Distinction  must  be  made  between,  first,  the  stimulus-reaction  rela- 
tion; and  second,  what  may  be  termed  the  apperceptive  influence  of 
the  mind. 

Now  it  seems  obvious  that  the  former  of  these  problems  is  purely 
academic.  Experience,  it  is  said,  or  more  concretely,  tables  and 
chairs,  are  objects  constructed  in  terms  of  a  stimulus-reaction  opera- 
tion. If  we  take  the  object  as  given  in  perception,  it  seems  absurd  to 
talk  about  that  object  as  being  the  stimulus  to  its  own  construction. 
How  can  an  object  given  in  perception  be  viewed  as  a  stimulus  ante- 
dating its  own  creation?  In  order  for  the  stimulus-reaction  problem 
to  have  any  meaning,  it  is  necessary  to  return  to  the  original  position 
of  Locke.  The  source  from  which  stimulations  proceed  must  be 
other  than  the  objects  given  in  perception.  There  must  be  in  every 
case  numerical  duplicity  between  the  perceived  object  and  the  source 

57 


of  stimulation.  Only  the  object,  the  construct,  can  be  known.  The 
source  of  stimulation  may  be  Locke's  primary  qualities  of  matter, 
Kant's  thing-in-itself  or  Mill's  "permanent  possibility  of  sensation," 
but  whatever  it  is,  it  transcends  knowledge.  The  stimulus-reaction 
problem  demands  some  such  transcendent  cause  of  stimulation,  but 
which  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  by  virtue  of  the  terms  in  which  the 
problem  is  set,  can  never  become  an  object  of  perception.  For  to  be 
an  object  of  perception  means  already  to  have  passed  through  the  era 
of  organization.  When  the  stimulations  are,  the  object  is  not  yet; 
when  the  object  is,  the  stimulations  have  performed  their  task. 

The  most  elaborate  example  of  the  stimulus-reaction  problem  is 
found  in  Kant.  The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  is  in  a  very  true  sense, 
an  atempt  to  show  how  a  table  is  a  table.  It  has  already  been  indi- 
cated that  Kant  returns  to  the  position  of  Locke.  We  have  the  thing- 
in-itself  and  the  transcendental  ego.  Now  experience,  or  nature,  or 
the  universe  represents  the  interplay  of  these  two  terms.  On  the 
ground  that  experience  is  the  product  of  this  interplay,  and  since  expe- 
rience is  found  to  be  a  system  of  connected  objects,  and  not  an  aggre- 
gate of  fragments,  the  mind,  in  order  to  account  for  this  coherence, 
must  be  endowed  with  an  elaborate  mechanism  of  forms  and  catego- 
ries. On  the  assumption  that  experience,  that  nature,  that  this  table 
is  a  construct  given  in  a  stimulus-reaction  operation,  it  can  only  be  by 
endowing  the  constructing  terms  with  all  the  qualities  and  relations 
which  the  perceived  table  is  seen  to  have.  According  to  the  terms 
in  which  Kant's  problem  is  set,  that  is  the  only  way  tables  can  be 
tables. 

It  may  be  that  nature  is  a  construct.  But  what  of  it?  If  so, 
the  construction  is  inevitable,  is  the  same  for  all,  and  the  process  of 
construction  goes  on  without  my  ever  being  aware  of  it.  It  is  some- 
thing which  is  over  and  done  with  before  I  come  consciously  on  the 
scene.  The  understanding,  it  is  said,  prescribes  laws  to  the  table. 
Let  us  suppose  that  I  do  not  know  that :  I  investigate  the  table,  and 
from  an  analysis  of  it,  find  the  laws  which  are  attributed  to  it.  It 
seems  a  matter  of  indifference  to  me,  so  long  as  the  laws  are  found  to 
be  there,  where  they  come  from.  After  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason 
has  given  me  an  object,  only  then  do  the  questions  which  I  am  in- 
terested in  begin  to  arise. 

In  short,  the  stimulus-reaction  problem  either  must  view  the  ob- 
ject as  being  the  stimulus  to  its  own  construction,  which  is  absurd; 
or,  it  must  view  the  process  of  construction  in  terms  of  such  univer- 

58 


sality  that  it  loses  all  practical  and  empirical  significance.  If  there- 
fore, the  result  of  viewing  experience  in  terms  of  the  stimulus- 
reaction  operation  affords  such  unsatisfactory  conclusions,  it  is  evi- 
dence that  the  fundamental  problem  should  be  stated  in  different 
terms. 

It  is  one  thing  to  view  nature  as  a  construct  on  the  assumption  of 
the  mind-object  relation.  It  is  altogether  a  different  thing,  from  a 
direct  analysis  of  experience,  to  discover  that  it  yields  a  polarization. 
Undoubtedly  we  do  find  experience  differentiated  into  the  act  of  ex- 
periena'/z^  and  the  content  experience.  But  this  distinction  is  the 
result  of  analysis,  and  has  nothing  whatsoever  to  do  with  any  stimula- 
tion-reaction fabrication. 

We  may  now  seek  to  determine  the  totally  different  question  touch- 
ing the  apperceptive  influence  of  the  mind.  This  problem  is  not  to 
be  confused  with  the  one  we  have  just  described.  The  problem  is 
Still  set  in  terms  of  the  subject-object  relation.  But  the  object  is 
now  viewed,  not  as  the  stimulus  to  its  own  primary  construction, 
but  to  some  further  secondary  construction  into  which  it  enters.  All 
sense  data  may  be  primary  constructs,  but  that  fact  seems  quite  ir- 
relavant  and  insignificant  in  comparison  with  the  secondary  construc- 
tion into  which  they  enter.*  It  is  in  connection  with  this  problem, 
it  really  seems  to  me,  that  idealism  finds  its  most  effective  support. 
Current  psychology  views  perception  as  a  highly  complex  process,  and 
the  content  perceived  is  usually  said  to  be  a  synthesis  of  sensory  ma- 
terial plus  past  experience,  habit,  memory,  attention,  and  present 
mental  content.  Professor  James  says:  "Every  perception  is  an  ac- 
quired perception."  It  is  commonly  pointed  out  that  we  see  in  the 
world  pretty  much  what  we  come  prepared  to  see.  The  perceptive 
process,  it  is  said,  always  involves  the  interfusion  of  various  intellectual 
elements.  Perceived  objects  are  always  saturated  with  meanings. 

Obviously  if  the  perceived  object  represents  the  interfusion  of  in- 
tellectual elements  we  can  no  longer  class  it  as  a  physical  event.  For 
if  the  perceived  object  reveals  any  modification  due  to  the  knowing 
process,  then  ipso  facto,  it  is  not  a  physical  event  and  if  not  a  physical 
event  then  its  existence  as  a  real  object  is  not  independent  of  its  being 
known.  The  issue  seems  to  me  to  be  this:  In  the  face  of  the  evidence 
furnished  by  idealism  regarding  the  apperceptive  activity  of  the  mind, 
can  it  be  maintained  that  the  perceived  object  is  independent  of  the 


*For  the  terms,  Primary  and  Secondary  Construction,  I  am  indebted  to 

Mr.  Nunn. 

59 


intellectual  nebulus  surrounding  it?  Is  the  perceived  object  a  "datum" 
whose  existence  is  physically  determined,  or  is  it  a  "construct"  whose 
existence  is  due  to  a  mind-object  interaction?  When  a  real  object 
becomes  a  perceived  object,  what  has  taken  place,  it  seems  to  me, 
represents  a  process,  not  of  addition  or  construction,  but  one  of  dimu- 
nition.  The  difference  between  a  real  object  and  a  perceived  object 
is  a  difference  sustaining  the  relation  of  part  to  whole.  The  perceived 
object  is  a  more  or  less  confused  and  imperfect  presentation  of  the 
real  object.  It  is  the  real  object  not  completely,  but  partially.  The 
perceived  object  is  always  the  outcome  of  some  sort  of  adjustment. 
It  is  just  because  the  perceived  object  is  different  from  the  real 
object  in  the  sense  that  it  is  a  variable  and  adjustable  manifestation 
of  it,  that  two  people  are  said  to  have  different  perceptual  contents 
when  they  are  looking  at  the  same  numerically  identical  object.  As 
to  the  question  whether  two  minds  perceive  the  same  real  object,  we 
may  at  least  posit  sameness  if  nothing  more  than  that  of  numerical 
identity.  But  the  possibility  of  there  being  two  or  more  perceived 
objects  expressive  of  the  one  real  object  lies  in  the  fact  that  each  per- 
ceived object  is  a  partial  and  variable  presentation  of  the  real  object. 

But  what  precisely  is  the  relation  of  intellectual  elements  in  the  de- 
termination of  this  variation  and  adjustment?  The  perceived  ob- 
ject is  always  complex.  Is  it  composed  of  elements  belonging  ex- 
clusively to  the  real  object  taken  in  its  physical  relations,  or  does  it 
possess  elements  derived  from  sources  outside  of  the  real  object  and 
its  physical  context?  Idealism  maintains  that  the  perceived  object 
is  a  synthesis  of  sensory  material  plus  added  memory  images  and  all 
sorts  of  intellectual  material.  The  sensory  stimulation  plunges  along 
the  neural  pathway  and  arouses  a  whole  host  of  associates,  and  the 
final  product  somehow  represents  a  fusion  or  blending  of  these  heter- 
ogeneous elements. 

Now  I  do  not  believe  that  a  perceived  object  represents  any  such 
synthetic  or  constitutive  process.  Memory,  past  experience,  and  at- 
tention do  undoubtedly  have  an  important  connection  with  the  prob- 
lem of  perception,  so  much  so  that  it  is  doubtful  whether  a  perceived 
object  is  ever  totally  independent  of  them.  What  I  do  not  believe  is 
that  they,  in  any  sense,  fuse  with  or  form  an  integral  part  of  the 
content  of  the  perceived  object.  They  have  to  do  with  what  object 
I  perceive.  They  are  the  controlling  factors  in  the  variation  and 
adjustment  which  the  perceptive  process  represents,  but  are  not  ele- 
ments which  coalesce  with  the  contents  perceived. 

60 


The  real  object  is  rich  in  qualities  and  in  possibilities  of  adjustment, 
inexhaustive  and  these  qualities  are  all  there  prior  to  and  independent 
of  my  experience  of  them.  The  datum  of  my  first  perception  is  very 
meager,  and  may  even  be  confused  and  distorted,  but  partial  as  it  is, 
it  nevertheless  is  a  physical  event.  The  second  time  I  perceive  the 
same  real  object,  new  qualities  are  given.  Each  new  experience 
brings  to  light  a  richer  datum.  But  this  growing  richness  in  the 
content  of  the  perceived  object  is  not  a  process  in  which  memory  pro- 
jects into  the  datum  images  of  the  prior  experience.  Past  experience 
has  made  possible  a  progressively  complex  datum.  I  now  perceive 
together  and  all  at  once  the  qualities  which  in  the  past  I  perceived  one 
by  one. 

The  process  of  perception  is  thus  seen,  to  quote  a  phrase  from 
Bergson,  to  be  a  process  of  selection,  and  of  selection  only.  One 
may  go  further  with  Bergson  and  maintain  that  the  dominant  prin- 
ciple of  this  choice  or  selection  is  that  of  practical  utility.  Out  of  the 
fullness  of  the  real  object  we  select  those  aspects  which  contribute 
to  our  needs  and  uses.  We  perceive  that  portion  of  the  real  object 
which  interests  us.  Different  people,  consequently,  have  different 
perceptions  just  because  they  are  different  pople.  They  have  different 
interests  and  different  needs  and  attend  to  any  object  with  a  view  to 
putting  it  to  different  practical  uses. 

My  whole  contention,  in  considering  the  position  of  idealism,  is 
that  the  cognitive  function  of  the  mind  exercises  in  perception  only  a 
selective  and  not  a  constitutive  influence,  that  it  determines  what 
my  perceived  object  will  be,  but  that  it  does  not  determine  or  in  any 
sense  create  or  modify  its  existence.  A  perceived  object  is  usually 
given  along  with  an  intellectual  context,  it  is  usually  surrounded  by 
a  nebulous  of  non-perceptual  contents  but  so  far  as  it  is  just  given, 
it  is  through  and  through  a  natural  event.  It  is  not  meant  to  deny 
that  objects  are  saturated  with  "meanings,"  but  those  meanings  arc 
imported  into  them.  They  are  not  given  as  existential  parts  of  the 
perceived  object. 

There  is  no  need  for  any  relating  or  synthesising  activity  of  the 
mind.  The  perceived  object  as  given  is  a  related  whole.  Objects 
exist  as  related  and  are  so  given  in  perception.  A  table  as  a  perceived 
object  is  just  as  much  an  element  of  perception  as  its  color,  or  shape 
is  an  element  of  sensing.  Perception  is  not  a  process  in  which  wholes 
are  built  up,  but  rather  one  in  which  wholes  are  broken  down. 

It  seems  certain  that  in  the  case  of  perception  the  content  of  which 

61 


I  am  aware  contains  more  than  what  is  directly  sensed.  I  sense  an 
aspect  of  an  object  but  I  say  that  I  perceive  the  object.  When  I  look 
at  the  ice  and  say  that  I  perceive  it  cold,  I  mean  what  I  say,  only 
it  must  be  stated  that  perception  includes  both  sensing  and  memory. 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  content  "cold  ice"  is  any  construct  of  a 
stimulus-reaction  psychology.  It  means  that  the  awareness  of  the 
content  has  been  generated  in  different  ways.  The  coldness  is  in 
the  ice  and  previous  tactual  experience  has  sensed  it.  Now  when 
I  look  at  the  ice  an  awareness  of  coldness  is  generated  as  well  as 
awareness  of  its  visual  qualities. 

So  far,  therefore,  as  there  is  any  construction  going  on,  it  is  a  con- 
struction on  the  side  of  awareness  and  not  a  construction  of  contents. 
Any  awareness  which  flares  up  at  any  one  moment  of  my  behaving 
may  represent  a  fufsion  of  separate  awarenesses  into  a  higher  unit,  or  it 
may  represent  a  continuum,  as  the  case  may  be.  What  I  feel  sure 
of  is  that  contents  do  not  fuse,  but  that  awareness  of  content  is 
generated  in  different  ways  and  these  awarenesses  constitute  some  sort 
of  a  continuum  or  whole.  The  consideration  of  the  awareness  ele- 
ment forces  us  even  beyond  sensing  and  memory.  I  say  I  perceive  the 
ice.  We  have  now  on  our  hands  the  problem  of  the  particular  and 
the  universal.  Certain  sensed  and  remembered  qualities  are  sub- 
sumed under  the  universal,  and  universals  can  not  be  perceived. 
2.  The  Subjective. 

I  shall  not  attempt  a  discussion  of  the  contents  of  the  Subjective. 
The  contents  of  the  Subjective  are  natural  events.  And  it  may  be, 
upon  more  severe  analysis,  that  many  and  perhaps  even  all  of  the  con- 
tents of  the  Subjective  can  be  shown  to  be  true  parts  of  the  Objective. 
At  present,  largely  because  of  insufficient  analysis,  the  abandonment 
of  the  Subjective  seems  to  me  improbable.  In  the  analysis  of  desire, 
will,  and  ethical  values,  I  am  disposed  to  follow  the  lead  of  Professor 
Dewey,  though  I  have  not  thought  out  into  clearness  the  realistic  or 
non-realistic  implications  of  such  an  analysis,  and  any  speculations  re- 
garding them  I  do  not  include  in  the  present  essay.  What  seems  clear 
is  that  the  contents  of  imaginations  are  more  intimately  connected 
with  the  knowing  process  than  contents  which  are  parts  of  the  Ob- 
jective. As  in  the  case  of  physical  relations,  we  have  maintained  that 
some  are  internal  and  some  external ;  so  in  case  of  the  knowing  rela- 
tion, it  is,  in  the  case  of  the  Objective,  external,  and  it  may  be,  in  the 
case  of  the  Subjective,  internal.  It  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  such 
contents  as  the  imaginary  numbers  of  mathematics,  golden  mountains, 

62 


and  round  squares  having  any  being  apart  from  the  act  which  is  con- 
scious of  them. 

It  is  a  matter  of  empirical  observation  that  contents  function  in  two 
different  contexts,  a  perceptual  and  a  non-perceptual  context.  The 
term  "perceptual"  is  here  intended  to  include  all  contents  directly 
encountered  through  the  senses  and  they  may  be  termed  sense-contents ; 
it  is  intended  to  include  all  contents  which  are  sensed  whether  or  not 
the  sensing  is  attended  by  awareness.  Contents  actually  given  through 
the  senses  and  contents  thought  about  represent  a  distincion  which 
concrete  analysis  yields.  The  contents  designated  by  such  terms  as 
memories,  imaginations,  volitions,  religious  and  ethical  values  are  cer- 
tainly not  given  in  the  same  sense  as  tables,  and  chairs,  and  head-aches. 
An  inventory  of  the  Objective,  as  we  have  seen,  includes  some  non-per- 
ceptual contents,  for  example,  universals  and  memory  contents.  In 
actual  experience  the  contents  are  usually  mixed.  Memory  enters  per- 
haps into  all  perception.  The  child  often  fails  to  distinguish  the 
contents  of  imagination  from  those  of  perception. 

As  to  the  localization  of  the  non-perceptual  contents,  none  are  lo- 
cated in  the  brain.  We  seem  forced  to  say  that  the  space-time-quality 
system  of  perceptible  things  does  not  comprise  the  whole  of  reality. 
There  are  existents  which  can  not  be  definitely  localized  anywhere, 
existents  to  which  the  category  of  space  is  not  applicable.  Some  such 
existents  are  universals  and  they  are  eternal  realities.  The  recognition 
of  this  fact  should  be  sufficient  to  distinguish  new  realism  from  ma- 
terialism. In  memory,  so  far  as  it  seems  advisable  to  speak  of  its 
contents,  the  content  is  a  space-time-quality  content  located  just  where 
the  remembered  content  was  when  it  was  given.  In  the  case  of 
other  contents,  so  far  as  they  involve  memory,  or  expectations  based  on 
memory,  the  contents  are  localized  as  in  the  case  of  memory.  So  far 
as  the  remaining  non-perceptual  contents  are  concerned  we  can  not 
say  that  they  are  spatially  located  anywhere.  They  certainly  are  not 
contents  fabricated  in  the  form  of  mental  images  located  in  any  mental 
repository.  The  difficulty  in  attempting  to  localize  them  is  due  to  the 
attempt  to  make  them  contents  of  perception,  and  the  success  of  this 
attempt  would  be  to  destroy  the  distinction  which  empirical  analysis 
reveals,  the  distinction,  that  is,  between  perceptual  and  non-perceptual. 
If  we  could  locate  the  contents  of  imagination  in  a  space-time-quality 
system,  they  would  no  longer  be  imaginations.  In  the  case  of  desire, 
when  it  becomes  satisfied,  is  no  longer  a  desire.  In  the  case  of  a  vo- 
lition, it  may  be  said  that  volition  involves  deliberation,  and  the  final 

63 


issue  only  gradually  emerges  as  I  think  the  situation  through.  If  I 
had  a  definite  presentation  of  the  act  I  will  perform,  its  performance 
would  not  be  volition. 

We  may  conclude  with  some  observations  touching  the  topic  of 
illusory  and  erroneous  experience.  Just  what,  it  may  be  asked,  is 
the  place  and  status  of  such  experience  in  the  universe  of  contents 
which  we  have  briefly  sketched  ? 

In  the  case  of  optical  illusions  involving  visual  displacements  and 
distortions  and  virtual  images,  whatever  status  they  have,  it  is  certain 
that  they  are  what  they  are  independent  of  the  psychical  act  which 
perceives  them.  It  may  be  that  such  illusions  are  only  while  they  are 
being  perceived.  But  this  can  only  mean  that  the  conditions  which 
generate  illusions  are  such  that  they  also  generate  awareness  of  them. 
Perhaps  sensory  optical  illusions  never  occur  apart  from  conscious- 
ness, but  this  does  not  mean  that  consciousness  has  any  thing  to  do 
with  their  appearance.  The  two  happen  under  co-incidental  condi- 
tions. The  illusion,  springing  into  being  under  peculiar  physical  con- 
ditions, conditions  usually  out  of  the  ordinary,  is,  when  the  conditions 
which  give  it  birth  are  altered,  totally  annihilated.  This  does  not 
mean  that  the  content  of  the  illusion  is  a  mental  fabrication.  A 
virtual  image  presents  no  difficulty  to  the  science  of  optics,  and  it 
should  present  no  difficulty  to  any  other  science  so  long  as  we  let  it  be 
a  virtual  image.  The  man  standing  on  the  bridge  at  midnight  sees 
two  moons.  No  difficulty  should  arise  in  seeing  the  two  moons,  but 
then  some  one  adds,  "when  he  ought  to  see  but  one."  Surely  this 
epistemological  reflection  regarding  the  validity  of  the  perception  is 
not  out  of  place,  but  then  we  have  departed  from  the  purity  of  the 
illusion  as  just  given.  What  happens  is  that  the  conditions  of  percep- 
tion have  been  interferred  with,  and  the  content  given  under  dis- 
ordered conditions  of  perception  does  not  correspond  with  similar  ex- 
periences when  the  perceptive  process  goes  on  more  normally.  People, 
we  might  suppose,  could  wear  glasses  so  adjusted  that  they  would  al- 
ways see  double.  If  such  persons,  after  becoming  habituated  to  this 
duplicity  of  visual  content,  were  to  raise  their  glasses,  they  would 
have  an  illusion. 

We  have  already  maintained  that  some  physical  relation  are  inter- 
nal. The  physical  qualities  of  an  object  are  what  they  are  on  account 
of  the  relations  in  which  they  stand.  And  those  relations  vary  with 
the  observer's  point  of  view.  The  object  seen  under  the  microscope 
is  seen  larger  than  the  same  object  when  not  seen  under  the  microscope. 

64 


No  difficulty  arises  so  long  as  we  stick  to  the  microscopic  or  non-mi- 
croscopic point  of  view.  Only  when  we  mix  the  observer's  point  of 
view,  do  troubles  begin.  The  visual  qualities  of  an  object,  when  that 
object  is  taken  in  different  sets  of  physical  relations,  are  different. 
But  this  view,  it  seems  to  me,  can  only  be  maintained  on  the  assumption 
that  some  physical  relations  are  internal.  Virtual  images,  are  not 
real  images,  neither  are  they  mental  fabrications  nor  parts  of  the 
Subjective.  Virtual  images  are  parts  of  the  Objective,  they  exist  inde- 
pendent of  being  perceived,  and  are  enmeshed  in  an  unbroken  chain 
of  casual  connections  with  contents  which  are  not  virtual  images. 

That  all  sensory  illusions  have  an  objective  physical  cause  and  that 
all  pure  hallucinations  are  centrally  induced  would,  I  suppose,  not 
be  denied.  And  that  the  world  in  which  we  live  is  one  in  which 
mistakes  may  be  made  would  also,  it  may  be  supposed,  not  be  denied. 
Every  sensory  illusion  contains  elements  which  are  real  and  elements 
which  are  hallucinatory.  The  real  elements  are  physical  existents, 
true  contents  of  the  Objective,  and  these  need  not  be  discussed;  only 
the  hallucinatory  elements  of  the  illusion  need  be  discussed.  I  am  walk- 
ing, let  us  say,  in  the  woods  on  a  moonlight  night,  and  perceiving  a 
shadow  I  say  that  I  see  the  figure  of  a  man.  Now  the  shadow  is 
a  physical  existent,  and  about  that  there  is  no  question.  But  what 
shall  we  say  touching  the  content,  figure  of  a  man,  which  I  think  I 
see?  The  illusion  consists,  not  in  seeing  the  shadow,  but  in  seeing 
the  shadow  as  a  man. 

We  have  already  pointed  out  that  contents  are  given  in  two  differ- 
ent contexts,  a  perceptual  and  a  non-perceptual  context.  Now  what 
happens  in  the  case  of  an  hallucination  is  that  contents  given  in  a  non- 
perceptual  context  are  taken  to  be  contents  of  a  perceptual  context. 
So  long  as  the  non-perceptual  contents  are  confined  to  their  own  con- 
text no  illusion  arises,  but  when  they  are  mistaken  for  contents  of  per- 
ception and  reacted  to  as  if  they  were  contents  of  the  Objective  then 
we  are  said  to  have  an  hallucination.  Hallucinations  usually  occur 
under  the  strain  of  high  emotional  excitement  and  this  emotional  ac- 
celeration gives  excessive  stimulation  to  the  production  of  non-per- 
ceptual contents  with  the  result  that  they  are  precipitated  with  such 
violence  that,  in  their  heightened  and  vivid  presentation,  they  are  com- 
parable to  and  consequently  taken  as  perceptual.  In  so  far  as  the 
hallucinatory  content  is  a  pure  memory  content  the  status  of  the  hallu- 
cination is  the  same  as  the  status  of  any  memory  content ;  in  so  far  as 
the  hallucinatory  contents  are  contents  of  the  Subjective  they  have 

65 


the  status  of  all  such  contents.  But  the  hallucination  consists  in  mix- 
ing the  two  sets  of  contents.  The  fact  that  all  contents  are  given  in 
connection  with  neural  processes  makes  such  confusion  possible. 

The  so-called  proof  reader's  illusion  is  a  good  one  to  instance.  The 
reader,  it  is  said,  sees  the  missing  word  in  its  right  place.  What 
happens  is  that  he  has  a  memory  awareness  of  the  right  word  and 
the  content  of  his  illusions  is  the  remembered  word.  In  the  case 
of  the  illusions  due  to  hypnotism,  a  similar  explanation  may  be  urged. 
The  hypnotist  arouses  a  heightened  array  of  non-perceptual  contents, 
and  due  to  the  power  of  his  suggestion,  these  non-perceptual  contents, 
either  actual  memory  contents,  or  contents  of  the  Subjective,  are  mis- 
taken for  contents  of  the  Objective.  No  two  hypnotic  patients,  the 
conjecture  may  be  made,  even  see  the  same  snakes.  Each  sees  and 
reacts  to  the  snakes  in  his  non-perceptual  field.  Of  course  the  diffi- 
culty arises  as  to  how  the  contents  of  a  non-perceptual  context  ever 
come  to  be  taken  as  contents  of  a  perceptual  context.  How  I  do 
not  know,  but  the  fact  is  they  are. 

Such  non-perceptual  contents  as  those  which  belong  exclusively  to 
the  Subjective  come  very  near  to  being  what  the  new  realist  has  de- 
scribed as  subsistents.  It  may  be  asked,  therefore,  why  I  employ  the  dis- 
tinction of  the  Objective  and  Subjective  rather  than  that  of  existence 
and  subsistence.  I  do  so  for  two  reasons:  first,  because  I  cannot  be 
sure  that  those  contents  which  the  term  Subjective  has  been  used  to 
describe  have  any  existence  apart  from  the  psychical  act  which  knows 
them;  and  second,  because  I  do  not  feel  forced  to  say  that  such  con- 
tents are  eternal  Platonic  entities.  I  cannot  see  why  it  is  necessary 
to  maintain  that  Colonel  Newcome  had  any  being,  even  of  a  subsis* 
tential  nature,  before  the  creative  work  of  Thackeray. 

But  I  feel  little  security  touching  my  views  of  the  Subjective.  They 
are  purely  tentative.  What  I  feel  sure  of  is  that  the  natural  order 
embraces  the  whole  of  reality;  that  there  are  physical  existents  which 
are  objects  of  actual  or  possible  perception,  and  universal  existents 
which  are  objects  of  thought;  that  consciousness  is  a  natural  happen- 
ing, that  the  passage  from  matter  to  mind  represents  no  rupture  of 
natural  continuity,  no  hiatus  within  the  natural  order.  I  feel  sure 
that  within  the  field  of  the  Objective  a  realistic  doctrine  is  fully 
applicable,  contents  exist  independent  of  consciousness,  and  that  con- 
sciousness, in  those  cases  where  it  occurs,  is  a  non-efficient  factor. 
I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  consciousness  is  undifferentiated,  the 
same  for  all  acts,  the  differences  being  describable  solely  in  terms 

66 


of  content;  and  finally,  that  consciousness  constitutes  a  continuum 
with  an  ebb  and  flow  directed  by  and  in  the  interest  of  my  body 
as  it  encounters  its  environment. 


VITA 

( In  compliance  with  the  requirements  for  Doctor's  dissertation. ) 
Matthew  Thompson  McClure,  Jr.,  was  born  at  Spottswood,  Vir- 
ginia, April  27,  1883.  He  attended  Washington  and  Lee  University 
1900-1905;  the  University  of  Virginia  1906-1907  and  1909-1910; 
and  Columbia  University  1910-1912.  Previous  degrees:  B.  A. 
Washington  and  Lee,  1904;  M.  A.  University  of  Virginia,  1907. 
Previous  positions:  Principal  of  the  Louisa  High  School,  Louisa, 
Virginia,  1907-1909;  instructor  in  philosophy,  University  of  Virginia, 
1909-1910;  assistant  in  Philosophy,  Columbia  University,  1910-1911, 
and  University  Fellow  at  Columbia,  1911-1912. 


THE  MCCLURE  CO.  INC.,  PRINTERS,  STAUNTON,  VA. 

67 


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